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This Article discusses the concept of therapeutic justice as it
is currently progressing in the Alaska court system.  The
Article begins with a discussion of the origins of therapeutic
justice as a theory and continues to explore therapeutic jus-
tice in Alaska in various contexts, including drug courts and
mental health courts.  The Article also discusses constitu-
tional implications for therapeutic justice, such as due proc-
ess and confidentiality concerns.  While the Article notes
that the novelty of therapeutic justice in the legal system
means that more research must be done to determine its effi-
cacy, it concludes that these innovative courts can be a cost-
effective, recidivism-reducing approach to criminal justice.
I.  THERAPEUTIC COURTS IN ALASKA:
HISTORY, DEVELOPMENT AND PRESENT STRUCTURES
Wellness Court . . . Anchorage Felony Drug Court . . . Mental
Health Court . . . Therapeutic Justice Courts.  Practitioners in Alaska
courts and observers of the justice system have heard these terms
used frequently during the past few years but have had no compre-
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hensive source of information about what they do and why they exist.
Underlying these new projects is a growing change in the justice sys-
tem’s response to the difficult problems presented by defendants
whose substance abuse or mental disabilities appear to be related in-
extricably to repeated criminal behavior.  Justice professionals de-
scribe this approach as “therapeutic justice.”  The purposes of this
Article are to describe the theoretical underpinnings of this new ap-
proach, to inform practitioners about the operating and planned
projects and to provide a foundation for the discussion and resolution
of the legal issues created by these responses to defendants’ prob-
lems.
A. The Development of Therapeutic Justice as a Concept
Both Roscoe Pound and Oliver Wendell Holmes were early
proponents of the concepts that shape therapeutic jurisprudence.1
Pound described a traditional system that was “‘formalistic,’ ‘logical,’
and ‘mechanical,’ and placed great emphasis on the process of finding
the ‘right’ law or legal principal [sic] and applying it to the current
problem.”2  He then said that the law “must look to the relationship
between itself and the social effects it creates.”3  Holmes is cited as a
forefather of therapeutic jurisprudence for his often-quoted state-
ment that begins, “The life of the law has not been logic,” and then
continues on to say that many factors other than logic go into deci-
sions about governing.4
More recently, as the term “therapeutic justice” began to be
used,5 it has been defined as “the use of social science to study the ex-
tent to which a legal rule or practice promotes the psychological and
physical well-being of the people it affects.”6  Legal theorists have
used “therapeutic justice” to “illuminate how laws and legal proc-
1. Hon. Peggy Fulton Hora et al., Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the Drug
Treatment Court Movement: Revolutionizing the Criminal Justice System’s Response
to Drug Abuse and Crime in America, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 439, 446 (1999).
2. Id. (citation omitted).
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. One article attributes the creation of the term to David Wexler, Professor of
Law and Professor of Psychology at the University of Arizona in Tucson, and Pro-
fessor of Law and Director of the International Network on Therapeutic Jurispru-
dence at the University of Puerto Rico in San Juan.  See John Petrila et al., Prelimi-
nary Observations from an Evaluation of the Broward County Mental Health Court,
37 COURT REV. 14, 19 (2001).
6. Hora et al., supra note 1, at 443 (quoting Christopher Slobogin, Therapeutic
Jurisprudence: Five Dilemmas to Ponder, 1 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 193, 196
(1995)).
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esses may in fact support or undermine the public policy reasons for
instituting those laws and legal processes.”7  Now, laws and legal pro-
cesses are beginning to be employed specifically for what are per-
ceived as therapeutic purposes.
Lawyers, judges, and the law itself “all function therapeutically
or antitherapeutically irrespective of whether the laws and legal ac-
tors take these consequences into account.”8  Another definition of
therapeutic jurisprudence espoused by Bruce Winick focuses on “the
law’s healing potential” and describes it as “a mental health approach
to law . . . consistent with other important legal values” that can “re-
shape law and legal processes in ways that can improve the psycho-
logical functioning and emotional well-being of those affected.”9
Winick argues that the therapeutic effects of new procedures apply
not only to defendants or participants in therapeutic court projects,
but also to the professionals creating and using the courts.  He sug-
gests that therapeutic effects occur in tort cases as well as criminal or
domestic cases if the participants use the principles.10  A recent series
of articles in the Seattle University Law Review explores the applica-
tion of therapeutic justice principles in the appellate courts, with one
author noting that “[a]ppellate judges are becoming more interested
in alternatives to the ‘argument culture’; they are increasingly inter-
ested in enabling the parties to create solutions to complex problems
in addition to declaring rights and naming winners and losers.”11
The following chart clarifies the similarities and differences be-
tween therapeutic justice and two other concepts: restorative and re-
tributive justice.
7. Hora et al., supra note 1, at 444.
8. Id. at 445 (citation omitted).
9. Q & A: The Psychologically-minded Lawyer, Transforming Practices, at
http://www.transformingpractices.com/qa/qa5.html (transcript of interview with
Bruce Winick, Professor of Law, University of Miami School of Law) (last visited
Apr. 11, 2002).
10. Id.  One example provided by Professor Winick is that “no-fault in the tort
area . . . emphasizes compensation, but tort victims often crave other things, like
apology and a process that puts the blame on the tortfeasor and relieves them (i.e.,
the victims) from responsibility.  The resolution of tort cases therefore should in-
clude some process that allows this to occur.”  Id.
11. Shirley S. Abrahamson, The Appeal of Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 24
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 223, 224 (2000).
COMPARISON OF JUSTICE THEORIES
Retributive Justice Therapeutic Justice Restorative Justice Community Justice
Definition of
Crime
Crime is a breach of a rule
created by the sovereign.
Crime should be addressed
by professionals who are not
connected to the victim or
the offender.
Crime is a manifestation of illness of
the offender’s body or character.
Crime should be addressed through
treatment by professionals.
Crime is a disruption of community
harmony and relationships.  Crime
should be addressed in the
community by the community, the
victim and the offender.
Crime is committed by people who are
not invested in the community and is
caused by complex social problems.
Crime should be addressed in the
community by a partnership between
the community and criminal justice
agencies.
Primary Focus Focus on defendant. Focus on defendant’s rehabilitation,
including teaching accountability.
Equal focus on offender, community
and victim.
Focus on enhancing and sustaining
community life as a way of preventing
crime and exerting social control.
Sentencing
Goals
Vindicate social values, deter
defendant and others, isolate
defendant from community,
rehabilitate defendant if
possible.  Primary beneficiary
is government, secondary is
society and tertiary is the
victim.
To correct or heal the offender, who
receives most services and benefits.
Society is secondary; victim benefits
to the extent that offender is
rehabilitated.
Repair the harm, heal victim and
community, restore offender to
healthy relationship with community
through offender accountability,
encourage community to take
responsibility for responding to
crime.
Similar to goals of restorative justice;
however, community justice also
attempts to address some of the social
problems underlying crime and to
involve local residents in planning and
decisionmaking.
Use of
Incarceration
A primary form of sanction May be used as a sanction and to
protect community (comparable to
quarantine)
May be necessary to protect
community; restorative justice
principles should be applied within
institutions
May be necessary to protect
community
Measures of
Success
Fairness of process; equality
and proportionality of
sanctions (i.e., sanctions are
related to seriousness of
crime and similarly situated
offenders receive uniform
sanctions)
Regained health of offender;
offender demonstrates
accountability in work, family and
community; low recidivism
Emotional and financial restitution
for victim, restoration of community
harmony, return of offender to
valued role in community and low
recidivism
Citizens are directly involved in setting
crime-response priorities; all citizens
are strongly invested in the
community, and crime rates decrease.
Examples Current criminal justice
system and most youth courts
Wellness Court, drug court, mental
health court, some tribal courts and
some youth courts
Victim-offender mediation, circle
sentencing, family group
conferencing, reparative probation,
citizen boards and some tribal courts
Community policing and prosecution,
Navajo Peacemaker courts,
community courts and some tribal
courts
Compiled in part from Judge Edward J. Cashman, Materials on Restorative Justice (NJC Document, 1998) and NIJ Research in Brief No. 3 (Sept. 1999).
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Therapeutic justice emphasizes the need to address the root
causes of a specific offender’s criminality, to treat the offender to re-
move the problems and to return the offender to the community as a
responsible citizen.  Restorative justice emphasizes repair of the rela-
tionships between the victim, community and offender.12  Retributive
justice, the model on which much of the United States’ criminal jus-
tice system is based, emphasizes fairness and punishment as more
important values than rehabilitation or other interests.  Each model
seeks to express community condemnation in order to protect public
safety and deter or dissuade the specific offender and others from
similar behavior in the future.13
B. Therapeutic Justice in Action: Drug Courts
The principles of therapeutic justice and drug courts developed
independently.  Drug courts grew out of efforts to respond to in-
creasing caseloads in the 1980s that included large numbers of sub-
stance-abusing offenders.14  One group has said: “The mission of drug
courts is to stop the abuse of alcohol and other drugs and related
criminal activity.”15  Therapeutic jurisprudence principles appeared to
establish a “jurisprudential theory” that provided the answers to why
and how drug treatment courts worked on a theoretical level.16
Practitioners quickly applied the same therapeutic jurisprudence
concepts and the structures developed in drug courts to courts that
dealt with persons with mental disabilities, family problems and do-
mestic violence issues.17  These courts often are referred to as “prob-
12. Writers on restorative justice often emphasize its roots in or resemblance to
indigenous justice systems from various cultures, including the Alaskan Indian and
Eskimo cultures.  See, e.g., Todd R. Clear & David R. Karp, Toward the Ideal of
Community Justice, NIJ JOURNAL 21 (Oct. 2000) (“Sentencing circles are rooted in
the traditional peacemaking rituals of both Native Canadians and Native Ameri-
cans.”).
13. ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.005 (Michie 2000).  Alaska’s sentencing statute incor-
porates these criteria set by the Alaska Supreme Court in State v. Chaney, 477 P.2d.
441 (Alaska 1970).
14. Hora et al., supra note 1, at 462-63.
15. THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF DRUG COURT PROFESSIONALS, DEFINING
DRUG COURTS: THE KEY COMPONENTS 7 (Jan. 1997), available at
http://www.nadcp.org/whatis/ (last visited Feb. 25, 2002) [hereinafter NADCP].
16. Hora et al., supra note 1, at 449.
17. David Wexler, Therapeutic Justice: An Overview, available at
http://www.law.arizona.edu/upr-intj/intj-o.html (last visited Mar. 16, 2001) (“The
therapeutic jurisprudence perspective, however, now applies to other legal areas,
probably all legal areas.  For example, the perspective applies to mental health law,
criminal law, juvenile law, and other areas.  Personal injury law has also received at-
tention.” (citations omitted)).
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lem-solving courts.”18  Although this Article focuses on the broader
concept of therapeutic justice and its application in many arenas,
much of the available literature and evaluation is associated with
drug courts.  The resulting predominance of drug courts in the discus-
sion does not imply that the usefulness of therapeutic justice concepts
is limited to drug courts.  As the Article demonstrates, these concepts
have been applied in the mental health courts in Anchorage and
elsewhere, and other literature shows their application in additional
contexts.
An administrative order from Chief Judge Gerald Weathering-
ton in Miami in 1989 created what appears to have been the first drug
treatment court.19 The drug court concept has been applied in the
context of drug and alcohol addictions, drunk driving cases,20 domes-
tic violence and child in need of aid and family cases.21  Drug courts
operate under the basic “understanding that substance abuse is a
chronic, progressive, relapsing disorder that can be successfully
treated.”22
Mentally disabled offenders appearing in mental health courts
that use a structure similar to that of drug courts find themselves in
rather different circumstances.  Mental disabilities usually are
chronic, but rarely are curable in the sense that an addiction might
be.23  However, mental disabilities often can be managed with appro-
priate medication and structure.  The hope is that the activities of the
18. Center for Problem Solving Courts, at http://www.problemsolvingcourts.
com/index.html (last visited Feb. 25, 2002).
19. Hora et al., supra note 1, at 454-55.  One source estimates that, as of May
2001, more than 600 drug treatment courts existed throughout the U.S.  STEVEN
BELENKO, RESEARCH ON DRUG COURTS: A CRITICAL REVIEW 5 (2001) [hereinafter
2001 UPDATE].
20. E.g., BERNALILLO COUNTY METROPOLITAN DWI/DRUG COURT POLICY &
PROCEDURE MANUAL (2000); NATIONAL DRUG COURT INSTITUTE, DUI/DRUG
COURTS: DEFINING A NATIONAL STRATEGY (Monograph Series 1, Mar. 1999); Larry
G. Sage, An Alcohol and Other Drug Court Experiment in Nevada, JUDGES’ J. 22
(Fall 2000).
21. John Feinblatt & Derek Denckla eds., Prosecutors, Defenders and Problem-
Solving Courts, 84 JUDICATURE 207 (2001).  Courts based on therapeutic justice
principles also are termed “problem-solving courts.”  Id. at 207.
22. Hora et al., supra note 1, at 463 (citation omitted).
23. CRIME AND JUSTICE RESEARCH INSTITUTE, EMERGING JUDICIAL
STRATEGIES FOR THE MENTALLY ILL IN THE CRIMINAL CASELOAD: MENTAL
HEALTH COURTS IN FORT LAUDERDALE, SEATTLE, SAN BERNARDINO, AND
ANCHORAGE xii (Apr. 2000) (“While a goal for substance abusers can clearly and
measurably be abstinence within the time frame of the drug court treatment pro-
gram, such a practical framework is not so readily available in the treatment of men-
tal illness.  Courts cannot say, ‘be cured within 12 months.’”).
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mental health court will respond to “the need for appropriate treat-
ment in an environment conducive to wellness and not punishment,
as well as the continuing necessity to insure the protection of the
public.”24  Some studies show that substance abuse and mental health
problems tend to coexist, such that individuals with a substance abuse
problem are substantially more likely to have a mental health prob-
lem and vice versa.25  As a commentator has recently noted, “Given
the biopsychosocial nature of drug addiction, ‘[t]he traditional adver-
sarial system of justice, designed to solve legal disputes, is ineffective
at addressing . . . [drug] abuse.’”26
Other specialized courts that differ from the therapeutic justice
courts have been created or proposed in the past two decades.  Some
courts have focused on case management approaches, seeking to
handle large numbers of cases or certain types of cases more effec-
tively.  For example, some courts that handle children’s cases or do-
mestic violence cases have concluded that having all related cases—
divorce, child custody, child in need of aid, protective orders and
criminal cases involving one or more of the same parties—before one
judge would improve the judge’s ability to make decisions about each
case’s disposition.27  An important difference between many of these
specialized courts and the therapeutic courts discussed in this Article
is that the specialized courts decide which cases are subject to the
court’s authority rather than allowing the defendants to choose
whether they will participate in, or “opt-in,” to the project.  Even in
24. Petrila et al., supra note 5, at 16 (citing Administrative Order No. VI-97-I-
1A, In re Creation of a Mental Health Court Subdivision within the County Criminal
Division, 17th Cir. Ct., Broward Co., Fla. (1997)).
25. Hora et al., supra note 1, at 466; see also id. at n.121.  Unfortunately, many
treatment programs in Alaska are not prepared to deal with persons who have co-
existing problems, so that a very large percentage of persons who might benefit from
therapeutic courts are excluded.  ALASKA JUDICIAL COUNCIL, FINAL REPORT OF
THE ALASKA CRIMINAL JUSTICE ASSESSMENT COMMISSION 36 (May 2000) [hereinaf-
ter CJAC Report] (stating “77 percent of the inmates treated by DOC mental health
staff have co-occurring substance abuse disorders.  The shortage of mental health
services, the prevalence of alcohol and drug abuse among the mentally disabled, and
the shortage of dual diagnosis treatment programs has resulted in an unprecedented
number of mentally disabled individuals being arrested and incarcerated.”).
26. Hora et al., supra note 1, at 467 (citation omitted).
27. Michael A. Town, The Unified Family Court: Preventive, Therapeutic and
Restorative Justice for America’s Families, at http://www.preventivelawyer.org
/content/essays/town.htm (last visited Feb. 25, 2002).  Another approach that some
Alaska practitioners are considering would set case management parameters only
for domestic violence cases and would not try to coordinate these with other types of
cases in which the same family members were involved.  Interview with Susanne Di
Pietro, Alaska Court System (Nov. 28, 2001).
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courts where the issue is not the offender’s addiction or medical con-
dition, the court’s monitoring and the opportunity to look at under-
lying addictions or substance abuse can be valuable adjuncts to judi-
cial sanctions.28
The U.S. Department of Justice Office of Drug Court Programs
requires that a drug court comply with ten “key components” before
it can receive federal funding.29  These ten components are (1) the in-
tegration of substance abuse treatment with justice system case proc-
essing; (2) use of a non-adversarial approach where the prosecution
and defense promote public safety while protecting the right of the
accused to due process; (3) early identification and prompt placement
of eligible participants; (4) access to a continuum of treatment, reha-
bilitation, and related services; (5) frequent testing for alcohol and il-
licit drugs; (6) a coordinated strategy among judge, prosecution, de-
fense and treatment providers to govern offender compliance; (7)
ongoing judicial interaction with each participant; (8) monitoring and
evaluation to measure achievement of program goals and gauge ef-
fectiveness; (9) continuing interdisciplinary education to promote ef-
fective planning, implementation and operation; and (10) partner-
ships with public agencies and community-based organizations to
generate local support and enhance drug court effectiveness.
C. Therapeutic Courts: Assets and Liabilities
The benefits and costs of therapeutic courts have been exten-
sively discussed.30  Some of the discussion remains theoretical because
few courts have existed long enough to perform meaningful longitu-
dinal evaluations, and many of the evaluations that have been per-
28. Landa B. Bailey, The Alaska Court System’s Role in Providing Equal Jus-
tice in Urban and Rural Alaska with Therapeutic and Domestic Violence Courts
(July 2001) (on file with the Alaska Judicial Council).  Bailey notes that
[i]n a mandatory court monitored domestic violence intervention pro-
gram, all batterers should be required as a condition of bail or probation
to participate in a state approved batterer intervention program that also
assesses whether concurrent chemical substance treatment is appropri-
ate . . . .  Sixty percent of supervised batterers in the Pilot Probation Pro-
gram for Misdemeanor Domestic Violence Offenders ‘were under the ef-
fects of alcohol (or drugs) at the time of the offense for which they were
being supervised.’
Id. at 8 (citations omitted).
29. RICHARD S. GEBELEIN, THE REBIRTH OF REHABILITATION: PROMISE AND
PERILS OF DRUG COURTS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SENTENCING & CORRECTIONS
(May 2000) at 3.
30. DRUG COURT CLEARINGHOUSE AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROJECT,
LOOKING AT A DECADE OF DRUG COURTS 6 (June 1998), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/dcpo/decade98.htm (last visited Feb. 25, 2002); BELENKO, su-
pra note 19, at 40-43.
CARNS_FMT.DOC 05/13/02  10:11 AM
2002]     THERAPEUTIC JUSTICE 9
formed have been limited in scope.31  Nevertheless, policymakers and
justice system professionals have identified a wide range of benefits
and concerns based on their experiences.
1. The Views of Judges and Court Administrators.  Judges and
court administrators differ strongly in their beliefs about the bene-
fits of the therapeutic justice approach.  Proponents of therapeutic
justice courts believe that the therapeutic justice model has re-
duced recidivism and increased the chances that defendants can re-
turn to their communities as productive individuals.32  Judges are
willing to see a defendant repeatedly in a structured setting for
months if they believe that in the end they will not see that defen-
dant back before them for sentencing on repeated offenses.  One
judge commented: “[F]or a long time, my claim to fame was that I
arraigned 200 cases in one session.  That’s ridiculous.”33  New York
State Chief Judge Judith S. Kaye notes: “In many of today’s cases,
the traditional approach yields unsatisfying results . . . .  Every legal
right of the litigants is protected, all procedures followed, yet we
aren’t making a dent in the underlying problem.”34  Some judges
see the situation as particularly troublesome for misdemeanor of-
fenders who receive at best minimal supervision and often little or
no treatment.35
One of the strongest expressions of support has come from the
Conference of Chief Justices (“CCJ”) and the Conference of State
Court Administrators (“COSCA”).  In an August 2000 joint resolu-
tion, CCJ and COSCA declared that “well-functioning drug courts
represent the best practice of these [therapeutic justice] principles
and methods.”36  The American Bar Association (“ABA”) also has
supported drug courts and therapeutic justice approaches, noting that
“studies indicate that between seventy to eighty percent of all persons
31. CHAS. MICHAEL JOHNSON, IMPACT EVALUATIONS OF DRUG COURT
PROGRAMS: THE COLLECTION AND MAINTENANCE OF POST-PROGRAM AND
COMPARATIVE DATA ARE VITAL TO SOUND OUTCOME EVALUATIONS AND
CONCLUSIONS ON THE OVERALL IMPACT OF DRUG COURT PROGRAMS 1 (May 31,
2001) (on file with the Alaska Judicial Council).
32. John Feinblatt et al., Judicial Innovation at the Crossroads: The Future of
Problem-Solving Courts, 15 COURT MGR. 28, 32 (2000).
33. Id. at 31 (citing What is a Traditional Judge Anyway?, 84 JUDICATURE 78, 81
(Greg Berman ed., 2000)).
34. Id.  See also Berman, supra note 33, at 80 (quoting the Hon. Judith Kaye as
saying “[w]e get a lot of repeat business.  We’re recycling the same people through
the system.”).
35. CJAC Report, supra note 25, at 44-45.
36. HON. JEFFREY S. TAUBER (RET.), RATIONAL DRUG POLICY REFORM: A
RESOURCE GUIDE  54 (2001).
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arrested for crimes have either an alcohol or illegal drug abuse prob-
lem.”37  The ABA adds that “‘[t]he human and political success of
therapeutic justice is too great to ignore.”38
Some court administrators and other judges express concerns
that the therapeutic courts will be of limited benefit to a few defen-
dants while consuming scarce resources at a rapid rate.39  In the short
term, the projects require extra time to (1) facilitate the frequent
meetings among the professionals and court staff involved in each
case, (2) hold regular hearings and (3) administer the network of
services, sanctions and incentives required to make the therapeutic
process work.  Project funding often does not include resources to
pay for the increased clerical burden on the courts or for the addi-
tional administrative time needed for judges to oversee the court’s
operations.40  Other justice system professionals are equally con-
cerned about the lack of resources for the added work involved in
each therapeutic justice project case.41
37. Proposed Standard 2.77, cmt., Procedures in Drug Treatment Courts, Stan-
dards Relating to Trial Courts (ABA Judicial Division) at 9 (adopted August 2001),
available at http://www.abanet.org (last visited Feb. 1, 2001) [hereinafter ABA
REPORT].
38. Id. at 10.  One part of the “human” success is the increased satisfaction felt
by judges and others who handle cases in therapeutic courts.  See Deborah J. Chase
& Peggy Fulton Hora, The Implications of Therapeutic Jurisprudence for Judicial
Satisfaction, COURT REVIEW 12, 13 (Spring 2000).  Judge Jeffrey Tauber emphasizes
the personal rewards for therapeutic court personnel as one of the primary reasons
for their use.  The Honorable Jeffrey Tauber, Address at Fall Alaska Judicial Con-
ference (Oct. 25, 2001).
39. California Campaign for New Drug Policies/Yes on Prop. 36, Drug Courts
Have Limited Reach, at http://www.drugreform.org/prop36/dc.tpl (last visited Feb. 1,
2001) [hereinafter Drug Courts Have Limited Reach].  The fact sheet says “[d]espite
several years of growth, today the drug court system in California reaches only a
fraction of all potentially eligible drug-abusing defendants—perhaps 5%.”  Id.
40. Funding for the Anchorage Felony Drug Court, the Wellness Court and the
Court Coordinated Resources Project (“Mental Health Court”) does not cover the
court’s costs in these areas.  Funding often does not cover the costs of setting up the
programs and does not always cover the costs of evaluation.  For example, the Well-
ness Court funding from a Byrne Discretionary Grant awarded in 2000 to Partners
for Downtown Progress (Anchorage) did not include any evaluation funds.  Partners
for Downtown Progress Byrne Discretionary Grant Application, Apr. 29, 2000 (on
file with the Alaska Judicial Council) [hereinafter Wellness Court Byrne Grant].  In
the Anchorage Felony Drug Court grant awarded to the Alaska Court System in
2000, all of the court’s expenses are in-kind contributions from the court system.  See
Alaska Court System Felony Drug Court Grant Application 2000 (on file with the
Alaska Judicial Council) [hereinafter Anchorage Felony Drug Court Grant].
41. Hora et al., supra note 1, at 511.
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Other concerns include worries that therapeutic courts may be
coercive, may become more paternalistic and repressive than the ex-
isting system42 and may be “net-widening,” i.e., they may impose
harsher penalties or expectations on relatively less serious offenders
rather than targeting more serious offenders.43  Some also believe that
drug courts may end up serving private interests rather than meeting
the community’s needs.44
Perhaps the most serious concern is that courts will be unable to
apply therapeutic justice concepts to more than a select few defen-
dants.  In a climate where all courts struggle for resources to address
their caseloads’ demands, resource-intensive therapeutic processes
appear out of reach for most cases.  Therapeutic courts typically serve
only a fraction of potentially eligible defendants.45  Estimates for the
Anchorage Felony Drug Court suggest that, at best, it would have re-
sources for about twenty percent of potentially eligible clients.46  The
early estimate of the number of eligible clients that could be served
was cut from fifty to ten when the treatment providers gave a more
detailed analysis of the cost of serving drug court participants at the
level expected by the terms of the federal grant.47  Observers looking
42. See, e.g., Berman, supra note 33, at 85 (“One final problem is . . . that these
courts are highly paternalistic.”); see also Feinblatt & Denckla, supra note 21, at 210
(“[T]hey pressure defendants to accept pre-ordained alternatives to incarceration.
How are they making judgments about what the proper treatment modality should
be for an individual?”).
43. See Feinblatt & Denckla, supra note 21, at 210 (“I am concerned that what
we are setting up is a wider net in the guise of help or treatment for our clients.”);
see also Carl Baar & Freda F. Solomon, The Role of the Courts: The Two Faces of
Justice, 15 COURT MGR. 19, 26 (2000) (“[T]his prominent group of drug court sup-
porters is ready to support increased penalties as a way of expanding the client base
and increasing the retention rate of treatment programs—a major step beyond the
original conception of drug courts as an alternative to already punitive drug laws.
And given the commission’s circular definition of drug addiction, the potential for
net widening seems very real.”).
44. Baar & Solomon, supra note 43, at 26 (“Critics [in Austin, Texas] saw the
new downtown community court siphoning resources from other priority projects—
and doing so in the interests of the downtown business community rather than the
public.”).
45. Drug Courts Have Limited Reach, supra note 39 (“[T]he four-branch drug
court [in San Diego county] processes 1.7% of all potential defendants each year.”).
46. See Anchorage Felony Drug Court Grant, supra note 40, at 10; ALASKA
COURT SYSTEM, 2000 ANNUAL REPORT 5.25 (2001).
47. At the March 22, 2001 Drug Court Committee meeting, the treatment rep-
resentative noted that if all drug court clients needed intensive out-patient treat-
ment, the program would be able to serve only ten clients for the funds available.
March 22, 2001 meeting notes (on file with the Alaska Judicial Council).  At a later
Drug Court Committee meeting, a figure of $6,650 per client was presented.  June
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at similar situations in other jurisdictions believe that drug court pro-
cedures eventually may become abbreviated and perfunctory if they
“go to scale” to serve a majority of the defendants with substance
abuse problems.48  Under such a system, defendants will lose the
benefits of individualized attention and therapeutic justice ap-
proaches will devolve into pro forma applications that would be no
more effective than the court procedures they replaced.49
2. The Views of Defendants.  One stated purpose of therapeu-
tic justice projects is to provide defendants with the structure, re-
sources and incentives to end their addictions or help them resolve
the problems that prevent them from leading satisfying and pro-
ductive lives.  Some defendants in therapeutic projects participate
because they share the belief that rehabilitation is possible.  Other
defendants may participate because they believe that the projects
are a less onerous choice than incarceration.50
Proponents of therapeutic justice cite substantial evidence that
coercing treatment through structures such as drug courts may result
in better outcomes.51  Evidence suggests that people in coerced or
mandated treatment (as distinct from voluntary treatment) are more
likely to complete the treatment.  Completion of treatment is critical
to significant reduction in the likelihood of relapse.52
Conversely, defendants may assess the difficulties of therapeutic
justice projects and decide that incarceration is preferable.  They may
believe that they would fail in any case and would prefer to serve
time in custody and be done with it.  Some do not believe that they
have a problem that needs treatment or that is amenable to the
treatment offered, and they may decline to participate on those
12, 2001 meeting notes (on file with the Alaska Judicial Council).  By contrast, the
amount for treatment was estimated at about $60,000.  Jean Sagan, Strategy for Sus-
taining Anchorage Drug Court When Federal Funding Has Expired (Alaska Court
System Oct. 16, 2001) (on file with the Alaska Judicial Council).
48. Gebelein, supra note 29, at 5.
49. Id.  (“As the number of clients grows, the tendency is to make do with the
same amount of resources as offered for fewer clients.  The usual result is deteriora-
tion of treatment quality as programs are shortened and more people are crowded
into each group.”).
50. See Susan Turner et al., Perceptions of Drug Court: How Offenders View
Ease of Program Completion, Strengths and Weaknesses, and the Impact on Their
Lives, 2 NAT’L DRUG COURT INST. REV. 61, 82 (1999).
51. Sally L. Satel, Drug Treatment: The Case for Coercion, 3 NAT’L DRUG
COURT INST. REV. 1, 5 (2000).
52. Id. at 4.
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grounds.53  Additionally, defense attorneys perceive incarceration as
less damaging for some defendants than participation in programs in
which the defendant can be repeatedly incarcerated for violations of
program guidelines.54
3. The Views of Prosecutors.  Prosecutors who favor drug
courts tend to believe that their role is to “represent[] the commu-
nity’s interest in public order.”55  Other prosecutors question that
“broader vision”56 and suggest instead that the goal of the criminal
justice system is for prosecutors to “put bad guys in jail”57 by win-
ning individual cases.  Supporters of the therapeutic approach sug-
gest that prosecutors working in therapeutic courts are as zealous
as those working in regular courts, but more accountable.  One
prosecutor noted that “unless I take a broader view of what it is to
be zealous, I’ll lose an opportunity to reduce crime.”58  Another
added, “I think retribution is more moral if there are earlier oppor-
tunities in the person’s involvement with the criminal justice system
to make another choice—to appeal to that person’s higher self.”59
Some prosecutors may object to specific ways of administering
therapeutic justice programs.  For example, many oppose pre-plea
programs that preserve defendants’ options for going back to trial.
“[A]s time passes I am in a weaker position as to my case and my ex-
penditure of resources.”60  For this reason, many prosecutors insist on
a plea from the defendant as a condition of entry into a therapeutic
justice project.  Other prosecutors perceive therapeutic justice’s col-
laborative, non-adversarial approach as incompatible with “the pub-
lic safety—and punishment-oriented goals of the prosecution[.]”61
53. For example, preliminary conversations and data from Anchorage Wellness
Court staff suggest that most defendants opting into the Wellness Court are older
repeat offenders.  Younger or first offenders do not see a need for treatment and do
not have the same incentives to participate in the lengthy Wellness Court program.
Nov. 7, 2001 Anchorage Wellness Court meeting notes 1 (on file with the Alaska
Judicial Council).  Anchorage Felony Drug Court team members mention the same
phenomenon.  Nov. 16, 2001 meeting notes 2 (on file with the Alaska Judicial Coun-
cil).
54. Feinblatt & Denckla, supra note 21, at 214 (“[A] client facing a couple of
weeks jail time for a conviction in a traditional court should not be facing a year in
jail after failing to complete a sentence for community service or treatment.”).
55. Id. at 208.
56. Id. at 209.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 212.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 213.
61. Hora et al., supra note 1, at 477 (citations omitted).
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They may reserve use of this approach for specific types of defen-
dants and consider it inappropriate for others.62
4. Other Justice System Perspectives.  Departments of Correc-
tions and the public have responded favorably to therapeutic jus-
tice projects in their current form and scope.  They favor the proj-
ects’ potential for reducing incarceration costs and for successfully
treating addictions.63  Alaska’s legislature has strongly supported
the concept, creating two new therapeutic justice projects by stat-
ute in 2001 and funding two existing projects.64  The new projects
will work with repeat Driving While Intoxicated (“DWI” or
“DUI”) defendants in the Anchorage superior court and with other
offenders with alcohol-related problems in the Bethel superior
court.
Many treatment providers also are supportive, although some
individuals believe that the process may be too coercive and that co-
erced treatment does not work.65  Thorny confidentiality issues may
arise with therapeutic justice projects because the projects require
agencies to share and discuss information that is otherwise protected
by complex confidentiality laws and regulations.  Another concern is
the change in the role of treatment providers from serving “exclu-
sively as the gatekeepers to treatment, as they have been accustomed
62. For example, because domestic violence is not an addictive disorder, some
prosecutors contend that therapeutic approaches are inappropriate.  See Notes on
draft article by Cynthia Cooper, Alaska Deputy Attorney General for Criminal
Prosecutions, Nov. 2001 (on file with the Alaska Judicial Council).  However, as this
article emphasizes, “therapeutic” refers to the effects of the procedures used in the
court, not to characteristics of the types of cases handled in the court.  Features of
therapeutic justice projects such as multiple appearances before a judge and swift
sanctions can be appropriately used in therapeutic projects oriented to domestic
violence offenders.
63. In addition to the support for therapeutic courts by the Conference of Chief
Justices and the Conference of State Court Administrators, Tauber, supra note 36,
at 53-55, other national organizations expressing support include The National Dis-
trict Attorneys Association, The National Sheriffs Association and the National As-
sociation of County Organizations,  Susanne Di Pietro, Why Drug Courts (Oct. 25,
2001) (unpublished PowerPoint slides from presentation to Judges Conference) (on
file with the Alaska Judicial Council).
64. H.B. 172, 22nd Leg., 1st Sess. (Alaska 2001) (creating two new courts and
providing funding for treatment of offenders in the Anchorage Wellness Court and
for offenders in the Juneau court using Naltrexone).
65. Hora et al., supra note 1, at 526 (“[M]any experts in the drug treatment field
have questioned the effectiveness of legally coerced treatment due to a belief that
individuals must enter a program voluntarily in order to have the requisite state of
mind for recovery.” (internal citation omitted)).
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to doing,” to having “[c]ourts . . . decide who will be sent to treatment
and when treatment can be terminated for poor performance.”66
D. Effectiveness of Therapeutic Courts
The concepts of therapeutic justice have come to the forefront at
a time when policymakers and the public are calling for greater ac-
countability in public expenditures.  Simultaneously, academics have
developed increasingly sophisticated tools and methods for evalua-
tion.  Therapeutic justice projects, with their stated purpose of stop-
ping “the abuse of alcohol and other drugs and related criminal ac-
tivity,”67 have come under scrutiny from their inception as a result of
these trends.
Although fewer than one hundred evaluations of therapeutic
courts have been published in the last ten years, many are under-
way.68  A number of preliminary or partial evaluations have been
completed and researchers have considered the effectiveness of
many of the separate components of drug courts, particularly the
use of monitoring and supervision, completion of treatment pro-
grams and use of coerced treatment.69
1.  Treatment of Addiction/Disease.  Various researchers have
demonstrated that treatment, if completed, reduces recidivism.70
Partial completion of treatment often appears to be better than no
treatment in reducing recidivism, but length of time in treatment
generally predicts the addict’s post-treatment success.71  Other
studies have shown that some types of treatment correlate more
significantly with reduced recidivism than others.  Cognitive thera-
pies that focus on objective changes in offenders’ thinking and be-
havior appear significantly more effective than individual counsel-
ing and other types of therapies.72  Treatment providers may use
several approaches in a treatment plan, offering cognitive programs
66. Id. at 480 (quoting JOHN S. GOLDKAMP, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, JUSTICE
AND TREATMENT INNOVATIONS: THE DRUG COURT MOVEMENT—A WORKING
PAPER OF THE FIRST NAT’L DRUG COURT CONFERENCE, DEC. 1993 8 (1994)).
67. NADCP, supra note 15.
68. 2001 UPDATE, supra note 19, at 6-7.
69. Satel, supra note 51, at 34-41.
70. Id. at 4.
71. Id. at 4-5.
72. Faye S. Taxman, Unraveling “What Works” for Offenders in Substance
Abuse Treatment Services, NAT’L DRUG CT. INST. REV., Winter 1999, at 110-11
(“Cognitive behavioral approaches consistently appear to be the most effective
treatment therapy for substance abusers.”).
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with individual counseling, group and family counseling, after-care
and other services needed by an individual offender.73
Other components of drug or therapeutic courts also have
proven effective when used separately or outside the context of the
therapeutic court.  In a Washington, D.C. study, monitoring and
closely supervising offenders on probation, by itself reduced the inci-
dence of positive drug tests.74  A Florida program uses intensive su-
pervision of probationers for DWI offenders, rather than a drug court
model, and has shown significant reduction in recidivism.75
The combination of these separate effective elements into
therapeutic justice courts has proven successful in many, though not
all, instances.  Published research shows that many drug courts have
reduced recidivism during their existence.76  However, a few projects
have not been able to demonstrate that the drug court population
73. Id. at 126.  The Wellness Court gives defendants access to cognitive thera-
pies, including Moral Recognition Therapy (“MRT”, trademarked).  See also Well-
ness Court Byrne Grant, supra note 40, at 8.  The Alaska Department of Corrections
has trained many of its staff in the understanding and use of cognitive approaches
and offers programs in many of its institutions.  See E-mail from Christy Flintoff,
Alaska Department of Corrections, to Teresa Carns (Feb. 2, 2001) (outlining the use
of “Cognitive Self Change” and “Choosing Change” programs by the Alaska De-
partment of Corrections) (on file with the Alaska Judicial Council).  The Anchorage
Felony Drug Court specified in its grant application that offenders would have var-
ied treatment opportunities, including family counseling and services “being pro-
vided in connection with the child protection system.”  Anchorage Felony Drug
Court Grant, supra note 40, at 8.
74. Adele Harrell et al., Nat’l Institute of Justice, Research in Brief, Evaluation
of the D.C. Superior Court Drug Intervention Programs (Apr. 2000) (unpublished
report on file with the Alaska Judicial Council). “Program participants and nonpar-
ticipants on both the sanctions and treatment dockets were significantly more likely
to test drug free in the month before sentencing, and a larger proportion of their
tests were negative compared to the standard docket sample.”  Id. at 7.
75. Miami-Dade Recidivism Project, Final Narrative 3 (unpublished report on
file with the Alaska Judicial Council).  “Remarkably, of the 364, only 14 have been
revocated [sic] . . . meaning that, at this point, only 4% have recidivated compared
with about 33% of the ‘general population’ of those who have had at least one
DUI.”  Id. (citation omitted) (emphasis omitted). Memorandum from Ronald F.
Taylor, Social Services Program Coordinator, to Elmer Lindstrom, CJAC Steering
Committee 6 (Feb. 26, 1999) (on file with the Alaska Judicial Council) [hereinafter
ASAP Memo] (“Dr. Araji’s research demonstrated that 75% of the DWI offenders
and 52% of the non-DWI offenders did not receive a new criminal/traffic offense
(2nd) within 3 years of their original ASAP referral.”).
76. 2001 UPDATE, supra note 19, at 28-30.
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fared any better in terms of post-program recidivism rates than the
control or comparison groups.77
2. Recidivism.  Researchers have conducted very few follow-
up evaluations analyzing re-arrest rates and experiences of partici-
pants and controls in drug court programs over the months or years
after completion of the program.78  The difficulties posed by long-
term evaluations include the added costs of more evaluations, the
problem of finding former participants and control group subjects
and the management of confidentiality issues.  Since most drug
court programs are relatively new, insufficient time has elapsed to
make realistic follow-up evaluations possible.79  A similar situation
exists for mental health courts and other therapeutic justice projects.80
As this Article will discuss, none of Alaska’s therapeutic justice proj-
ects has been evaluated as of yet.  However, the Alaska Court System
has asked the Alaska Judicial Council to evaluate all five of the for-
malized projects discussed in this Article.81
E. Costs of Therapeutic Justice
Therapeutic justice projects are resource intensive.  Even the
projects that have functioned for some period of time without out-
side funding have managed only by using substantial time volun-
teered by judges, attorneys and other persons and organizations in
the community.  For example, both the Wellness Court and the
Mental Health Court in Anchorage functioned for a number of
months without grant funding or other outside support.  The Mental
Health Court used University of Alaska-Anchorage interns for some
staff support.  Other than the interns, the judges, treatment providers
and attorneys involved in these projects contributed all of the time
77. 2001 UPDATE, supra note 19, at 33-34.  Of six evaluations summarized in the
table on pages 33 and 34 of the 2001 UPDATE, one showed a small difference in re-
arrest rates that was not statistically significant (Tarrant County, Texas); another
(Las Vegas, Nevada) showed that drug court participants were re-arrested at a sig-
nificantly higher rate than the control group (26% vs. 16%).  The other four evalua-
tions in the table showed better results for the drug court participants than for the
comparison groups.  Id.
78. Steven Belenko, Research on Drug Courts: A Critical Review, 1 NAT’L
DRUG CT. INST. REV., Summer 1998, at 7 [hereinafter 1998 Research Review].
79. Id.
80. Petrila et al., supra note 5, at 17 (describing the formal evaluation just get-
ting underway for one of the better established mental health courts, the Broward
County, Florida, Mental Health Court).
81. The evaluations will include the Anchorage Felony Drug Court, the Mental
Health Court, the Anchorage Wellness Court, the Anchorage Felony DUI Court
and the Bethel Therapeutic Justice Project.
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needed to plan and bring the courts into operation.  The resources
needed for therapeutic justice projects include added time for judges,
attorneys and clerical staff, increased treatment resources, increased
monitoring and drug testing of defendants, and expenses (in most
programs) for case managers and coordinators.  Because these costs
are often listed in a single document, such as an application for grant
funds or legislative support, opponents of drug courts find it easy to
suggest that they consume extraordinary resources for the number of
participants.82
A more realistic analysis would compare the costs for a drug
court to the costs of incarcerating the same defendant for at least a
year (the typical length of many drug court programs) and the costs
of releasing the defendant untreated (the typical situation for most
defendants).83  In Alaska, the cost for an Anchorage Felony Drug
Court participant is estimated at $16,950 annually, as compared to the
cost of more than $40,000 per year for incarceration.84  One observer
suggests that because many of the defendants are repeat offenders85
who face presumptive sentences of two years or more, the actual
costs of incarceration usually would be double the $40,000.86  The cost
of incarceration does not include any of the costs associated with in-
vestigating the crimes charged, the costs of court processing (clerical
and judge time, prosecution and defense costs) or costs of pretrial in-
carceration or pre-sentence report preparation for felony defendants.
The cost for the Anchorage Felony Drug Court does include some
attorney time, but neither judge time nor clerical time for any of the
participants.87
Depending on the program, defendants bear some of the costs.
The Wellness Court, for example, particularly emphasizes the need
for defendants to become economically self-sufficient and pay part or
82. Drug Courts Have Limited Reach, supra note 39.
83. CJAC Report, supra note 25, at 33 n.73.
84. INTERIM STATUS REP. OF THE ALASKA CRIMINAL JUSTICE COUNCIL app. C,
at 1 (2002) (on file with the Alaska Judicial Council) [hereinafter INTERIM CJC
REPORT].  These figures were prepared in connection with the Criminal Justice
Council’s presentations to the Alaska legislature on H.B. 172 in March, 2001.
85. Anchorage Felony Drug Court Grant, supra note 40, at 4 (“The program is
likely to be most attractive at the outset to persons fearing the imposition of signifi-
cant jail time.  This group generally has some criminal history.”).
86. Memo from Larry Cohn, Judicial Council Executive Director, to the Alaska
Judicial Council, Nov. 28, 2001 (on file with the Alaska Judicial Council).  Mr. Cohn
notes that as a private attorney in 2001, he represented a client in a drug case in
which the “operation took about 3 months and cost in excess of $20,000 for the in-
vestigation alone.”  Id.
87. Anchorage Felony Drug Court Grant, supra note 40, at Budget Pages 1-5.
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most of their monitoring and treatment costs.88  Some Wellness Court
participants are supervised on an electronic monitoring program that
typically costs $12 to $15 per day.89  Participants also must pay the
cost of Naltrexone90 (about $70 to $150 per month91) and some or all
of the treatment costs.  In other therapeutic projects, the expectation
is that most participants will be indigent and unable to pay some or
all of the costs of participation.92  Some projects expect that Medicaid
or private insurers may help with costs that are beyond the defen-
dants’ means.
These differences in practices highlight different philosophies
underlying similar projects.  Proponents of having defendants pay ar-
gue that even if some defendants cannot participate due to very lim-
ited resources, those defendants who can should participate.  Others
contend that requiring any payment unfairly limits the program to
those who have the economic resources to participate.
88. Frank Dahl, DWI Program Offers Best Solution, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS,
Nov. 10, 2001, at B6 (“Refreshingly, the Wellness Court program saves taxpayer
dollars by mandating financial responsibility from participants through employment
that covers the cost of treatment.”).
89. An exhibit to a court order signed by Judge Wanamaker shows the cost of
House Arrest/Electronic Monitoring to be $14 per day.  See State v. Synette Under-
wood, No. 3AN-00-8618CR, Judge’s Memorandum and Order, Jan. 19, 2001, Ex-
hibit A, Condition No. 8.
90. Naltrexone is a prescription medication that dulls the pleasurable sensations
associated with alcohol use and reduces a person’s craving for alcohol.
91. Telephone interview with Thea Whitehead, Partners for Downtown Prog-
ress Community Liaison (Aug. 29, 2001).  The Naltrexone Treatment Order used in
the Wellness Court program notes that
[t]his order should only be used in those cases where Defendant certifies
that he/she has available sufficient insurance or cash to cover the antici-
pated $555 to $990 costs of this order.  Further, Defendant must demon-
strate that he/she has a sufficient plan for housing social group [sic] and
work before the plan is approved.
Synette Underwood, 3AN-00-8618CR, Exhibit C, at 1.
92. The H.B. 172 fiscal note for treatment services anticipates 125 offenders be-
tween the Bethel and Anchorage alcohol therapeutic courts and estimates costs of
$685,400 (approximately $5,483 per offender for treatment).  The fiscal note does
suggest that a substantial portion of the cost might be “self-pay.”  Health and Social
Services fiscal note for CSHB 172 (JUD), Mar. 26, 2001.
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F. The Development of Therapeutic Courts in Alaska
1. Introduction.  Alaska Supreme Court Chief Justice Dana
Fabe led off her 2001 State of the Judiciary address to the legisla-
ture with a discussion of therapeutic court projects:
There are three touchstones by which we can measure Alaska’s
justice system as it enters the new millennium and I would like to
address them today.  They are Innovation, Collaboration, and
Improved Access to the Justice System . . . .  The face of justice is
changing in response to new challenges and needs.  In the crimi-
nal law arena, traditional justice approaches have produced
some disappointing results, with repeat offenders who cycle
through the criminal justice system . . . .  Courts nationwide have
been trying new approaches.  One example is the therapeutic
court model.93
Chief Justice Fabe’s comments suggest that the court system sees
therapeutic justice projects as an important innovation among those
with which it is working.
As the term “therapeutic” is used in Alaska today, it suggests an
approach to justice system problems that involves structured rela-
tionships among the court, attorneys and treatment providers.  The
Chief Justice summarized Alaska’s approach to therapeutic justice as
follows:
[a]n individualized plan is developed for a defendant, which usu-
ally includes drug or alcohol testing, treatment, and such other
requirements as attaining a GED, finding and maintaining a job,
and making restitution.  Defendants are closely monitored and
must come to court often, before the same judge.  That judge be-
comes familiar with the defendant, and imposes immediate jail-
time for non-compliance with the plan’s requirements, while
providing positive reinforcement when a defendant lives up to
the plan’s expectations.94
The following sections describe the existing and planned thera-
peutic justice projects in the state.95
93. Dana Fabe, State of Judiciary (Feb. 28, 2001), at http//www.state.ak.us
/courts/state01.htm (last visited April 1, 2002).
94. Id.
95. Each of these sections has been reviewed at least once by the judges and
staff involved in these projects and by other selected reviewers statewide in Novem-
ber of 2001.  Comments and suggestions made by the reviewers have been incorpo-
rated into the current version of the Article, as of January 2002.  Readers should
note that the projects change their policies and procedures to adapt to requirements
set by funding agencies, changes in the law and needs and concerns of staff and par-
ticipants.  The information in this Article should not be used to make any final deci-
sions about a particular case or defendant.
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2. Anchorage Mental Health Court (Court Coordinated Re-
sources Project)
a. History of Treatment of the Mentally Ill in Alaska.  Pres-
sure from a number of sources - including de-institutionalization of
mentally ill persons, the rise in the homeless population, prison
overcrowding and continual criminal recidivism by mentally ill per-
sons - provided incentives for the development of a mental health
court for low-level offenders in Anchorage.  The court has been
operating since mid-1998.
Before statehood, the territory of Alaska had no mental health
services available to mentally ill persons.  Individuals experiencing
mental difficulties were removed from their homes by the federal
government and sent to reside in an institution in Portland, Oregon.96
At statehood, the responsibility for providing mental health services
was transferred to the new state government, and the Alaska Mental
Health Trust was established.  The Trust received one million acres
of prime land to fund development of a comprehensive integrated
mental health program.  Beginning at statehood, the State provided
continuous and increasing mental health services to its citizens.
However, in 1982 a class action suit was brought against the State by
citizens who required mental health services not available in Alaska,
and who objected to Alaska’s management and re-designation of the
trust lands.97  The plaintiff class prevailed, and the Trust was reconsti-
tuted in 1994 with one million acres and $200 million.  Since that
time, the Alaska Mental Health Trust Authority has managed the
Trust to ensure the development of a comprehensive integrated men-
tal health program for use by Trust beneficiaries.98
As part of its comprehensive program, Alaska has a single psy-
chiatric institution, the Alaska Psychiatric Institute (“API”), located
in Anchorage.  Built in the early 1960s,99 API has followed the trend
of mental institutions in the United States to downsize, shifting pa-
tients to community-based treatment services through a process
known as “de-institutionalization.”  The movement away from insti-
tutionalizing mentally ill persons took hold in the United States in the
1960s in response to several issues.  State-run mental health institu-
tions tended to be old, expensive to operate, overcrowded and imper-
96. Alaska Mental Health Trust Authority, Trust Overview, at http://www.
mhtrust.org/t_ov.html [hereinafter Trust Overview].
97. State v. Weiss, 706 P.2d 681 (Alaska 1985).
98. Trust Overview, supra note 96.
99. Press Release, Governor Tony Knowles, Gov. Knowles Bill Finances New,
Improved API Facility (Feb. 15, 2001), available at http://www.gov.state.ak.us
/PRESS/01048.html.
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sonal.  The majority provided custodial care but little if any treat-
ment.  To lessen operating expenses and improve patient care, state
and federal officials began to develop and support programs designed
to transfer responsibility for mental health care from state-run institu-
tions to community-based facilities.  They believed that community-
based services could provide earlier detection and individualized
care, and could minimize the use of hospitalization for less severely
disabled patients.100
As it progressed, the de-institutionalization movement di-
verted large numbers of seriously mentally ill people away from in-
stitutions and into communities.  However, under-funding pre-
vented the alternate system of community-based services from
effectively filling its anticipated role.  Increasing numbers of per-
sons no longer housed in institutions eventually committed of-
fenses directly related to the offenders’ untreated mental disabili-
ties.101  Without community-based outpatient services to respond to
the mental health issues, most of the offenders were incarcerated,
often for minor offenses for which other offenders might be re-
leased.
b. The Mentally Ill and Disabled in Alaska’s Jails and Prisons.
By 1998, American prisons and jails held 238,000 mentally ill of-
fenders, comprising sixteen percent of state prison and jail inmates
and seven percent of federal inmates.102  This percentage was higher
in Alaska than in the rest of the country.  According to one study,
as the end of the century approached, nearly one-third of Alaska
prison and jail inmates suffered from mental illness or disability.
The Alaska Department of Corrections had become the State’s
largest institutional supplier of mental health services, serving
many more mentally disabled adults than API.103  As in the rest of
the country, Alaska’s mental health system experienced deinstitu-
tionalization between 1979 and 1999.  API downsized from 225
100. Gary E. Whitmer, From Hospitals to Jail: The Fate of California’s Deinstitu-
tionalized Mentally Ill, 50 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 65-75 (1980); Melissa Win-
inger, Mental Illness in the Justice System and the Mental Health Court 4 (Apr. 12,
2001) (unpublished student manuscript, on file with Alaska Judicial Council) [here-
inafter Wininger Paper].
101. Goldkamp & Irons-Guynn, supra note 23, at 3.
102. Id. at 2.
103. CJAC Report, supra note 25, at 34-35 (“On a snapshot day in January of
1997, 37 percent of the 3,091 inmates (or 1,154 inmates) in Alaska’s correctional in-
stitutions were Mental Heath Trust beneficiaries.  On that same day, the census at
API was 79.” (citations omitted)).
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beds to seventy-nine beds.104  The facility intended to continue this
trend by downsizing to fifty-four beds.105
c. Development of the Anchorage Mental Health Court.  In
July 1998 the state Department of Corrections, with the coopera-
tion of the legal community, treatment providers, the Alaska Men-
tal Health Board and the Alaska Mental Health Trust Authority,
established the Jail Alternative Services Program (“JAS”) as a pi-
lot program to provide community mental health services place-
ment for misdemeanor inmates.106  At about the same time, Judge
Stephanie Rhoades and a committee of court staff, attorneys,
treatment providers, corrections personnel and other individuals
created the Court Coordinated Resources Project (“CRP”) to
identify mentally ill persons entering the criminal justice system for
misdemeanor offenses and to divert them to community-based
treatment.107
Offenders participating in both JAS and CRP have their court
cases assigned to the mental health court project, which monitors of-
fenders’ compliance with their specific treatment programs.  Both
projects accept individuals being prosecuted by either the State or
municipal prosecutors’ offices and individuals who may be defended
by a state public defender, the Office of Public Advocacy, municipal
contract defense attorneys or private attorneys.  The two district
court judges [the Honorable Stephanie Rhoades and the Honorable
John Lohff, who were initially assigned to preside over the mental
health court] remain responsible for the project at this time.108
While participants in both programs report to the mental health
court, the target populations and the institutional history of the pro-
grams differ.  A grant from the Alaska Mental Health Trust Author-
ity established JAS as a three-year pilot program in the Department
of Corrections.  The program is intended to reach incarcerated per-
104. Id. at 36 n.81.
105. Id.; see also Community Mental Health/API Replacement Project, Project
Update, available at http://www.hss.state.ak.us/dmhdd/api/api2000.htm (last visited
Feb. 18, 2002).
106. Christopher M. Hamilton & Steven L. Hamilton, Jail Alternative Service
Program Evaluation 1 (2000) (on file with the Alaska Judicial Council).
107. Goldkamp & Irons-Guynn, supra note 23, at 48-49.  Goldkamp states that
both programs started in July 1998, but the executive order authorizing the Coordi-
nated Resources Project (“CRP”) was not signed until April 1999.  Ct. Admin. Or-
der #2AN-99-02.  Some form of the program operated unofficially for a period of
time prior to its establishment by court order.
108. Interview with the Honorable Stephanie Rhoades, Alaska District Court,
Anchorage, and Kathi Trawver, CRP Project Manager, in Anchorage, Alaska (July
26, 2001) [hereinafter Rhoades & Trawver Interview].
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sons who have specified mental conditions (e.g., psychosis or organic
brain injury).  The program serves up to forty participants at any one
time, with five of those slots reserved for organically-impaired indi-
viduals.109  Program funds support the work of a case coordinator who
identifies, coordinates and links mentally ill misdemeanor offenders
with community services.  This individual also monitors offenders’
compliance with their conditions of release.110
The non-jail court-based program (CRP) initially worked with
existing court resources, volunteered services of the two judges, uni-
versity students, municipal and state prosecutors and defense attor-
neys.111  CRP tries to reach misdemeanor offenders who have been
diagnosed with, or who show indications of, any mental impairment,
a broader set of criteria than that used by JAS.112  Individuals may be
referred to CRP whether or not they are currently in custody and
whether they are first-time or repeat offenders.  Any number of of-
fenders may participate in the program at a given time.113  Virtually
anyone involved with the offender (e.g., attorney, prosecutor, judge,
law enforcement officer, jail staff, family member or mental health
worker) may make the initial referral to the mental health court.
CRP clients include mentally disturbed individuals who do not qual-
ify for the JAS program, either because they are not incarcerated or
because they do not meet the specific JAS diagnosis requirements.114
CRP also handles persons who qualify for JAS but who are excluded
from that program for lack of space.  Mental health referral services
in CRP (which are provided in JAS by the case coordinator) initially
were developed primarily by defense attorneys or by treatment pro-
viders in the case of offenders with existing connections to providers.
Municipal prosecutors provide some monitoring services for CRP cli-
ents that are similar to but more limited than those performed by the
case coordinator for JAS clients.115
109. Hamilton & Hamilton, supra note 106, at 4.
110. Id.
111. Wininger Paper, supra note 100, at 19.
112. CRP clients also do not need to be incarcerated, another difference between
CRP and JAS.  See Goldkamp & Irons-Guynn, supra note 23, at 50.
113. Hamilton & Hamilton, supra note 106, at 1-3, 6; Rhoades & Trawver Inter-
view, supra note 108.
114. Christopher M. Hamilton & Steven L. Hamilton, Court Coordinated Re-
sources Project 6 (2000) (unpublished report) (on file with the Alaska Judicial
Council) [hereinafter 2000 CRP Report] (“[T]o be eligible for the JAS program, an
individual must have a psychotic or organic disorder as a primary diagnosis.  The
CRP, however, deals with a much broader range of primary diagnoses including de-
pressive disorders, personality disorders, mood disorders, and substance abuse dis-
orders.”).
115. Goldkamp & Irons-Guynn, supra note 23, at 51-53, 63.
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In 2000, the Mental Health Trust Authority (“MHTA”) funded
CRP to hire a project manager and case coordinator.116  The project
manager coordinates the CRP work, including administrative duties
and community outreach activities.  The case coordinator coordinates
treatment referrals and monitors client compliance and progress.117
In some ways, the addition of these positions has made CRP more
similar to JAS.  Because CRP continues to serve a more diverse
population than JAS, and still does not limit the number of partici-
pants it serves, it continues to struggle with issues that do not affect
JAS.118
The Anchorage Mental Health Court serves four distinct
groups of mentally impaired individuals: (1) JAS participants,
whose case management may be performed by the JAS case coor-
dinator or a treatment service provider; (2) clients not receiving
mental health treatment when they are referred to the court, who
receive case management services from the CRP case coordinator;
(3) clients receiving treatment when they are referred and who
continue to be served by a case manager in a community service
program; and (4) clients not receiving treatment when they are re-
ferred, but who are beyond the number able to be serviced by the
CRP case coordinator and who primarily receive case management
services from a defense attorney.  Any of the non-JAS groups may
include persons who are eligible for JAS but are not receiving JAS
services for various reasons.
d.  Features of the Program.  Anchorage’s mental health court
works to address the individual causes of each participant’s behav-
ior and to provide non-jail therapeutic treatment to assist them
with functioning acceptably in society.  Based on the drug court
model, the project uses a team approach to select defendants who
can benefit from the program while not posing an undue risk to
other members of society.119  The court refers the selected offenders
to treatment programs, monitors their progress through the pro-
grams and imposes sanctions on, or offers incentives to, the partici-
pants based on their progress.120
116. Alaska Mental Health Trust Authority, Status Report 2-3 (2001) (on file
with the Alaska Judicial Council) [hereinafter 2001 CRP Report].  These staff
members were hired in January and April of 2001.
117. Id. at 1-3.
118. See Goldkamp & Irons-Guynn, supra note 23, at 49.
119. Id. at 58.  “The Anchorage mental health court proceedings are much more
informal than normal adversarial proceedings in criminal cases, and follow after the
fashion of drug courts.”  Id.
120. See id. at 49.
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However, the program departs significantly from the drug court
model.  Unlike participants in drug court, not all mental health court
participants follow similar treatment regimens.  Participants in drug
courts tend to arrive in the justice system with a similar problem, a
drug addiction, while participants in mental health courts may suffer
from widely different maladies and have very different treatment
needs.  Drug courts usually set a specified period of abstinence, at-
tainable through a phased program, as a goal for participants.  They
set benchmarks along a path to successful program completion and
schedule “graduation” from the program.  Success in a mental health
treatment program usually cannot be so clearly stated or measured.121
Because mental health court clients generally are chronically ill with
little likelihood of being “cured,” the goal of the mental health court
focuses less on a bright line change in participants’ behavior than on
improving participants’ quality of life.  Mental health court goals in-
clude improving the ability of clients to function in society, reducing
the clients’ number of criminal offenses and reducing the need for in-
stitutional mental services.122
A typical mental health court case begins with the referral of a
defendant who either has a mental health diagnosis or who shows
symptoms of a mental disability.  Defendants are referred to the
court by individuals such as police, magistrates, judges, attorneys,
family, friends, treatment service providers and Department of Cor-
rections staff.123  In addition, the CRP project manager scrutinizes all
district court arraignment lists for names of defendants familiar to the
court and refers those cases to CRP.124  Once a defendant is referred
to mental health court, the court attempts to have all the defendant’s
outstanding cases consolidated under the mental health court judge.
The court schedules mental health court hearings one afternoon
each week.  Judges assigned to the project carry a typical caseload as
well as their mental health caseload.  If it appears at the first hearing
that a defendant may not be competent to decide whether to partici-
pate in the program, the judge (each judge has received special
training in the recognition and handling of mental health problems)
refers the defendant to a psychiatrist for evaluation.  If necessary, the
court schedules a competency hearing.125
At the initial hearing or the first hearing following a determina-
tion of competency, the court explains the mental health court proc-
121. See id. at xi-xii.
122. See CJAC Report, supra note 25, at 35.
123. Goldkamp & Irons-Guynn, supra note 23, at 57.
124. See Wininger Paper, supra note 100, at 19.  In earlier phases of the court, this
work was done by student interns and volunteers.
125. See Goldkamp & Irons-Guynn, supra note 23, at 51-52.
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ess to the defendant.  The defendant must voluntarily opt-in, with the
advice of counsel and in cooperation with the prosecutor.  Opting-in
generally involves entering a guilty or no contest plea and agreeing to
treatment in exchange for suspended jail time.  The pleas usually are
Rule 11126 negotiated pleas.  Defendants may pursue pretrial motions
before opting-in.  Those who choose not to opt-in go to trial before a
district court judge who may or may not be one of the mental health
court judges.  If found guilty, defendants may be referred to one of
the mental health court judges for sentencing.127
After a defendant opts-in to the mental health court, a treatment
plan is developed by the JAS or CRP case coordinator, a defendant’s
existing treatment provider or the defense attorney, working with
community mental health service providers.  When the plan satisfies
the mental health court judge, the defendant is sentenced.  Typical
sentences include three to five years of probation, with conditions
that incorporate the mandated treatment plan and suspended jail
time.  The suspended portion of the sentence provides an incentive
for completion of treatment.128
Defendants appear regularly in court after sentencing, on a
schedule specific to each case.  The judge may see defendants weekly,
bi-weekly, monthly or at even longer intervals, depending on the
other supervision available and the participant’s case plan.  The case
coordinator monitors the participant’s treatment progress, living
situation and compliance with probation conditions and reports to
the court at the scheduled hearings.129  The lack of probation supervi-
sion for misdemeanor offenders in Alaska places all of the monitor-
ing responsibility on other parties.130  If the participant does not have
a JAS or CRP case coordinator, the court and the prosecutor receive
reports directly from the treatment providers.131  Prosecutors, par-
ticularly the Anchorage municipal prosecutors, maintain some moni-
toring responsibility for the defendants in CRP.
A participant’s treatment plan may be modified to account for
incidents of non-compliance and to ensure that the participant’s
needs are met.  For non-compliance, the judges can impose sanctions,
126. Rule 11 of the Alaska Rules of Criminal Procedure governs plea agree-
ments in state court.
127. See Goldkamp & Irons-Guynn, supra note 23, at 53-54.
128. See id. at 54.
129. See 2001 CRP Report, supra note 116.
130. See  CJAC Report, supra note 25, at 44-45.
131. Goldkamp & Irons-Guynn, supra note 23, at 55.  “The participant is re-
quired to sign a release of information document that permits the judge and the
prosecutor to receive reports about compliance with program conditions from the
mental health facility and program to which the defendant has been assigned.”  Id.
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ranging from counseling or admonitions by the judge, to imposition
of jail time.  In cases of severe repeated violations, the prosecutor
may petition to revoke probation.  The final step for defendants who
fail to comply with their treatment plan or who choose to “opt out”
of the program is revocation of probation and imposition of the sus-
pended sentence, with credit for any jail time served while in the pro-
gram.132
An unusual aspect of the mental health court that distin-
guishes it from the typical drug court model is the fact that a de-
fendant already in the CRP program may be arrested on a new of-
fense and yet choose not to have the matter handled in mental
health court.  This may happen if a mental health court participant
is arrested on an evening or weekend when the mental health court
judge is not available.  If the participant is facing a brief sentence,
he or she may choose to plead guilty to time served or agree to a
short sentence rather than wait for a mental health court hearing.133
In most drug courts, substantial efforts are made to ensure that the
drug court judge supervising a given participant handles all new ar-
rests and court-related matters.  Participants do not have a choice
in the matter.  This is part of the agreement that participants make
when they enter the program.
e.  Results/evaluations.  The MHTA grants for both JAS and
CRP fund independent evaluations of the programs.134  Early re-
sults for JAS, the only program evaluated to date, are encouraging.
Of 243 diagnostically eligible persons referred, fifty-four defen-
dants participated in the program.  The length of time in the pro-
gram for the fifty-four clients ranged from 3 weeks to 2 years, with
a mean stay of 12 months.  The most common reasons for non-
participation included the defendant having been sentenced, re-
leased or bailed before the opt-in hearing.135  About three-quarters
of the referrals and participants were male.  Ages ranged from
twenty to seventy-two, with a mean of thirty-four years.  Cauca-
sians made up a plurality of participants (39%), with significant
numbers of Alaska Natives (26%), African-Americans (20%) and
American Indians (11%).136
132. See id. at 55.
133. Interviews with Kathi Trawver, CRP Project Manager, and Steve Williams,
CRP staff member (May 7, 2001).  This is also supported by Judicial Council review
of data and court cases for CRP referrals and participants from 2001.  Id.
134. 2001 CRP Report, supra note 116; see also Hamilton & Hamilton, supra note
106, at 1.
135. See Hamilton & Hamilton, supra note 106.
136. Id. at 19.
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The JAS evaluation compared participants’ behavior while in
the program with their behavior in the twelve months preceding their
admission.137  On average, JAS clients experienced fewer and shorter
admissions to the Alaska Psychiatric Institute.  Thirty-seven percent
of participants had at least one admission during the program, com-
pared with fifty percent in the preceding twelve months, and the av-
erage length of stay dropped from 12.9 days to 12.4 days.138  They also
experienced fewer arrests (1.4 arrests per participant during the pro-
gram versus 3.4 during the preceding twelve months) and shorter jail
stays per arrest (22.6 days versus 30.2 days).139  Participants’ housing
situations markedly improved during program participation as well.140
The CRP program does not yet have outcome data.  Reported
demographic information shows that including the fifty-four JAS
participants, the mental health court saw 249 persons between July
of 1998 and June of 2000.  Males constituted about three-quarters
of the population.  Ages ranged from eighteen to eighty-six, with a
mean age of thirty-eight.  The CRP population had more Cauca-
sians, over sixty percent.  Seventeen percent of the CRP population
were Alaska Native, eleven percent African American and eight
percent American Indian.141  Further evaluation of JAS, as well as
an evaluation of CRP, is ongoing.142
3.  Anchorage Wellness Court
a.  Development of the Anchorage Wellness Court.  Inspired in
part by the success of the Anchorage mental health court143 and in
part by the success of other judges using Naltrexone to treat alco-
hol-addicted offenders,144 Anchorage District Court Judge James
Wanamaker developed the Anchorage Wellness Court.  According
to the Byrne Grant application for the Wellness Court, Anchorage
district court judges estimated that at least two-thirds of the mis-
demeanor cases they handled involved repeat offenders who had
137. Id. at 8.
138. Id.
139. See id. at 8-14.
140. Id. at 2.
141. 2000 CRP Report, supra note 114.
142. Christopher M. Hamilton & Steven L. Hamilton, Jail Alternative Service
Program Evaluation 4-5 (Nov. 2001) (prepared for State of Alaska Dept. of Correc-
tions) (on file with the Alaska Judicial Council) [hereinafter 2001 JAS Report].
143. Wellness Court Byrne Grant, supra note 40, at 3.
144. Letter from the Honorable James N. Wanamaker, Alaska District Court,
Anchorage, to Melissa Winegar [sic], Alaska Judicial Council, 1 (Dec. 24, 2001) (on
file with the Alaska Judicial Council) [hereinafter Wanamaker Letter].
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either violated their probation conditions or committed new of-
fenses.145  Up to eighty or ninety percent of these repeat offenders
had drug or alcohol problems (primarily alcohol problems).146
A major distinguishing feature of the Wellness Court has been
the use of Naltrexone, pioneered by the Butte County, California
DUI court.147  The Wellness Court was made available to alcoholic
offenders, primarily repeat drunk driving offenders, who were willing
to make a commitment to use Naltrexone.148  The Wellness Court, as
initially conceived, generally required defendants to have an alcohol
addiction assessment and to go to a state-approved treatment pro-
vider for treatment supplementing the use of Naltrexone.  In addi-
tion, defendants agreed to comply with various conditions, such as
holding a steady job or becoming economically self-sufficient, at-
tending support groups and being monitored for substance use.
The program drew from a broad base of supporters, including
local non-profit organizations, Partners for Downtown Progress, the
Anchorage Downtown Partnership, the municipal prosecutor’s of-
fice, court administrators, the Alaska and Anchorage Bar Associa-
tions and a diverse group of community members, including several
former alcoholics.149  Initially, like the mental health court, Wellness
Court operated without any external funding.  The program began
operating in August 1999 and served twenty defendants in its first
year of operation.150  In 2000, Partners for Downtown Progress re-
ceived a Byrne Discretionary Grant of $150,000.151  The grant funds
145. Wellness Court Byrne Grant, supra note 40, at 2.
146. Id.  The grant application notes that:
[a]lcohol consumption in Alaska is far beyond the national norms.  As of
1994-95, Anchorage spent more per household on alcoholic beverages
than any of the other 60 metropolitan statistical areas surveyed . . . .
Alaska’s apparent alcohol consumption rate is the 8th highest in the na-
tion, and Anchorage’s consumption is higher than the Alaska average.
Id. at 1 (citations omitted).
147. Wanamaker Letter, supra note 144, at 1.  The Naltrexone court ordered
treatment program was developed by California Superior Court Judge Darrel Stev-
ens.  Id.
148. See Frequently Asked Questions About Naltrexone (brochure provided by
Assisted Recovery Centers of America, Phoenix, AZ) (on file with the Alaska Judi-
cial Council) [hereinafter Naltrexone Facts]; see also John H. Krystal, M.D., et al.,
Naltrexone in the Treatment of Alcohol Dependence, 345 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1734
(2001).
149. Wellness Court Byrne Grant, supra note 40, at 3.
150. Note from the Honorable James N. Wanamaker, Alaska District Court, An-
chorage, “DUI/Drug Courts: Defining a National Strategy,” distributed at the
Therapeutic Justice Workshop, Anchorage, Alaska (Dec. 2000) (on file with the
Alaska Judicial Council).
151. Id.
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permitted the hiring of a case coordinator, housed in the municipal
attorney’s office, who works with forty defendants per year, and a
community liaison, who helps participants find suitable housing and
community services.152  The grant also provides “grub stake” funding
to help participants meet treatment expenses and purchase materials
needed to run the program.153
The Byrne Grant funding for Wellness Court expired at the
end of 2001.154  Partners for Downtown Progress asked the state
legislature to appropriate funds to continue the program after that
date and to fund a Naltrexone court in the Juneau District Court.155
The legislature thus appropriated $75,000 for expenses related to
the Wellness Court and $10,000 for the Juneau Naltrexone Court.156
b.  Features of the Program.  The grant application for Byrne
funding for the Wellness Court describes its target group as indi-
viduals who are trapped in a cycle of alcoholism, commission of
misdemeanor offenses, time spent in jail and reoffense after re-
lease—but who have the potential to break the cycle.157  This group
is expected to include men and women and to reflect the ethnic di-
versity of Anchorage’s population.158  However, the Wellness Court
population may contain a disproportionate number of Alaska Na-
tives because of the migration of Alaska Natives from isolated
communities to Anchorage and the susceptibility of people from
small, isolated communities to the stresses of a strange city.159
The Wellness Court uses many of the key components of drug
courts.160  These include early identification and referral of potential
participants; voluntary participation by offenders; frequent appear-
ances by participants before the same judge; timely judicial recogni-
tion for progress and sanctions for violations; emphasis on personal
responsibility; treatment, including counseling and group support;
and case coordination to help participants develop and successfully
152. Id.
153. Letter from Janet McCabe, Chair, Partners for Downtown Progress, to
Representatives Eldon Mulder and Bill Williams, Alaska State House of
Representatives 1 (Mar. 29, 2001) (on file with the Alaska Judicial Council).
154. Id.
155. Id. at 3; Memorandum from Rep. Norman Rokeberg to Rep. Bill Williams
and Senator Pete Kelly (Mar. 29, 2001) (on file with the Alaska Judicial Council)
[hereinafter Rokeberg Memo].
156. Id.
157. Wellness Court Byrne Grant, supra note 40, at 5.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 1-5.
160. Compare Gebelein, supra note 29, at 3.
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complete a case plan.161  Other elements, notably the particular moni-
toring provisions and the mandated pharmacological intervention,
both discussed below, distinguish the Wellness Court from other drug
courts.
As with mental health court, referrals to the Wellness Court
come from many sources, including prosecuting attorneys, public de-
fenders, private defense attorneys and other judges.  Most defendants
referred to Wellness Court have misdemeanor DWI charges, either
state or municipal.  The program tries to consolidate all pending cases
involving a Wellness Court participant before the Wellness Court
judge and to resolve all cases under the defendant’s case plan.162
Judge Wanamaker holds Wellness Court hearings one afternoon
each week.  The judge, attorneys and treatment providers discuss on-
going and potential cases at a meeting held just before defendants
and participants appear in court.163  The actual court time devoted to
Wellness Court hearings is brief—about three hours each week.
The typical offender accepted into Wellness Court is a repeat
drunk driving offender.164  The court ordinarily does not accept first-
time offenders.  Evidence suggests that the majority of first time of-
fenders (especially DWI offenders) referred to the Alaska Alcohol
Safety Actions Program (“ASAP”)165 do not re-offend regardless of
how the courts handle their cases.166  Also, most first-time offenders
do not face enough potential jail time to motivate them to participate
in the program.  Wellness Court also accepts defendants with repeat
alcohol-related offenses other than DWI.
After a referral to Wellness Court, the defendant appears before
the judge for an explanation of the program.  If the defendant, with
the advice of counsel, decides to “opt-in,” the judge requires the de-
fendant to select a state-approved treatment provider for a substance
161. Memorandum on “Anchorage’s Wellness Court for Alcoholic Offenders,”
distributed at the Therapeutic Justice Workshop (Dec. 2000) (on file with the
Alaska Judicial Council) [hereinafter Anchorage’s Wellness Court].
162. Wellness Court Byrne Grant, supra note 40, at 11-12.
163. Wanamaker Letter, supra note 144, at 2.
164. Many repeat drunk driving offenders are charged with misdemeanors.
Those defendants charged with a third or subsequent DWI offense within five years
of the two previous DWI offenses were tried as felons until mid-2001.  New legisla-
tion changes this “look-back” provision over the next five years until felony DWI
will include all offenders with three or more DWIs over a ten-year period.  H.B. 132,
22nd Leg., 1st Sess. (Alaska 2001).
165. The Alaska Alcohol Safety Actions Program (“ASAP”) provides alcohol
screening and case management services for individuals who have current or
pending criminal cases.  Individuals may be referred to ASAP as a condition of
sentencing or as a pre-conviction condition of release.
166. ASAP Memo, supra note 75, at 6.
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abuse assessment and a physician for a determination regarding the
appropriateness of Naltrexone.167  The judge may refer some defen-
dants for mental health evaluations or schedule them for competency
hearings.  Defendants accepted into the program will plead to
charges and have the imposition of their sentences deferred.168  Most
offenders participating in the Wellness Court have municipal misde-
meanor charges against them.169
As with typical drug courts, defendants in Wellness Court de-
velop case plans, with help from a case manager, one or more treat-
ment providers and their attorneys.  When the court finally accepts
the defendant into the program, the judge approves the case plan and
sends the defendant to the chosen treatment provider to begin im-
plementing the plan.  Treatment requirements for participants in-
clude monitoring for drug and alcohol abuse, a 120-day Naltrexone
regimen and participation in Nal Group, a support group for Nal-
trexone users.170  Each individualized treatment program may include
individual and group counseling, participation in twelve-step groups
such as Alcoholics Anonymous (“AA”) or Narcotics Anonymous
(“NA”) and cognitive therapy.171
Monitoring of participants’ substance use is an important com-
ponent of a therapeutic court program focusing on substance abuse.
Because the body metabolizes alcohol more rapidly than it does
other drugs, typical drug testing systems and schedules are inade-
quate to detect alcohol use.172  Wellness Court has addressed this is-
sue through placement conditions built into case plans.  Most Well-
ness Court participants must provide a court-approved third-party
custodian, who monitors the participant’s use of Naltrexone and ab-
stinence from alcohol.  Individuals who cannot find an acceptable
third-party custodian or who have relapsed or violated a plan condi-
tion, but not so seriously as to be removed from the program, may be
required to stay in a Community Residential Center, a residential
treatment program or go on house arrest enforced by electronic
167. Naltrexone Facts, supra note 148.  Naltrexone is contraindicated for some
medical conditions and for pregnant women.
168. Wellness Court Byrne Grant, supra note 40, at 8.
169. See Wanamaker Letter, supra note 144, at 2.
170. Naltrexone Facts, supra note 148.  At weekly meetings, support group mem-
bers discuss progress or problems from the previous week.  In addition to helping
with Naltrexone-specific issues, the group functions to enhance participants’ self im-
age and to foster team spirit.
171. Anchorage’s Wellness Court, supra note 161.
172. See Abstinence Monitoring for the Wellness Court (Oct. 6, 2000) (on file
with the Alaska Judicial Council) [hereinafter Abstinence Monitoring].
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monitoring.173  Another form of monitoring defendants in the Well-
ness Court project involves police officers.  An innovative community
policing program, initially designed for use with juveniles, trains uni-
formed patrol officers to supervise Wellness Court probationers.  The
police officers contact the Wellness Court defendants during random,
frequent home visits.  The officers can then perform alcohol assess-
ments and otherwise monitor the status of the participants.174  The
Wellness Court also may use technology such as the Sobrietor to
check for abstinence.  This device allows remote monitoring of par-
ticipants’ alcohol levels over telephone lines.175
Initially, the Wellness Court expected defendants to complete
their programs in six months, including a ninety-day regimen of Nal-
trexone.  The current expectation is that a participant will complete
the program in eighteen months, including 120 days of Naltrexone.
Judge Wanamaker has explained that research demonstrates that
longer participation times reduce the incidence of relapse.176  No sig-
nificant side effects appear to accompany the longer period of Nal-
trexone use.177  Shortly after the program was lengthened, the number
of defendants opting-in dropped.  More recently, however, defen-
dants were again choosing to opt-in.178
Because Wellness Court structures each treatment plan indi-
vidually, it is difficult to generalize about the status of legal charges
and the ramifications of “failing” in the program.  Typically, partici-
pants who do not succeed or who opt out are either sentenced or are
brought to trial on their original charges.  The court encourages them
to maintain their ties with the program and the Nal Group and to
speak to future Wellness Court participants.
Several other Alaska judges have experimented with similar
programs involving judge-supervised Naltrexone use for defen-
dants in their courts.  These include other Anchorage judges,
judges in the Juneau district court and the Tok magistrate.  The
legislature provided $10,000 to the National Council on Alcoholism
173. See Wellness Court Policy Meeting (Jan. 10, 2001) (comments by the Hon-
orable James N. Wanamaker, Alaska District Court, Anchorage) (on file with
Alaska Judicial Council).
174. Wellness Court Order and Conditions of Release:  Monitoring by Anchor-
age Police Dep’t  (on file with the Alaska Judicial Council).
175. Sobrietor Reference Manual (on file with the Alaska Judicial Council).
176. Interview with the Honorable James N. Wanamaker, Alaska District Court,
Anchorage.
177. Id.
178. Id.
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and Drug Dependence to pay for treatment for Juneau defendants
in Juneau’s Wellness Court.179
4.  Anchorage Felony Drug Court
a.  Development of the Anchorage Felony Drug Court.  Alaska
was one of the last states to join the drug court movement of the
1990s.  The court system, supported by the State’s Department of
Corrections, the Department of Law, the Department of Health
and Social Services and the Public Defender agency, applied for a
Department of Justice Drug Court Program Office (“DCPO”)
planning grant in 1998.180  The grant application noted that An-
chorage trial courts were “burdened by a large volume of felony of-
fenders known to have been under the influence of illegal drugs at
the time of arrest, which allows for the deduction that violent and
non-violent crimes are often committed in connection with drug
use.”181  The application also noted that a majority of both male and
female arrestees in Anchorage tested positive for illegal drugs after
arrest and that drug and alcohol-related offenses accounted for
about one-third of felony filings in Anchorage.182
Proponents believed that an Anchorage drug court could im-
prove “recidivism rates, periods of abstinence, and financial self
sufficiency” of low-level non-violent felony offenders who commit-
ted their offenses “while under the influence of or while in posses-
sion of illegal drugs or alcohol, or while addicted to drugs and alco-
hol where there is some nexus between the addiction and the
commission of the offense.”183  These offenders usually received
straight probation or probation with jail sentences of less than six
months.  They typically left the judicial and correctional systems
without receiving attention related to their substance abuse is-
sues.184
The implementation grant application requested $400,000 in
federal funds over two years matched by $140,000 in state funds for a
felony level drug court.  Originally the court planned to target all
adult felony offenders or felony probation violators with appropriate
179. Rokeberg Memo, supra note 155.  The Juneau project was funded with a
$10,000 capital budget appropriation in May 2001.  Id.
180. Felony Drug Court Supporting Documents, Applicant Certification Drug
Court Implementation Grant, Planning Grant No. 98-DC-VX-0038, 3 (Feb. 18,
2000) (on file with the Alaska Judicial Council) [hereinafter Grant Support].
181. Anchorage Felony Drug Court Grant, supra note 40, at 2.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 4.
184. Id. at 2.
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charges,185 including both alcohol and illegal drug offenses.186  The
program planned to require felony adjudication in each case (i.e., a
“post-plea/suspended sentence” program).  The three-phase treat-
ment program for a typical offender would last twelve to eighteen
months.  Defense counsel would identify possible participants.  The
state district attorney would screen referred defendants, and a quali-
fied substance abuse treatment provider acting as case manager
would assess each defendant.  The judge would hold the final ap-
proval.  Upon successful completion of the program, charges would
be dismissed, set aside, reduced, or allowed to stand, according to
terms of individual negotiations conducted at the outset of each case.
The program expected to serve thirty participants during start-up and
to be serving eighty active participants (assuming new funding
sources came on line) by the end of its second year.187
The Alaska grant application included funding for half-time at-
torney positions in the state district attorney and public defender
agencies—a type of funding that DCPO typically did not grant.  Ac-
cording to the judge in charge of the project, DCPO approved the
grant because of the level of interest and dedication demonstrated by
the participants in the grant process.188  The fact that Alaska was one
of the few remaining states without a drug court might also have in-
fluenced the DCPO to approve the atypical grant provision.  The
grant application did not include federal funding for court system,
corrections or treatment resources, except a salary for a case man-
ager.189
b. Implementation of Anchorage Felony Drug Court.  Immedi-
ately upon approval of the grant, participants raised concerns
about the lack of funding for treatment and the possibility that the
program might siphon treatment resources away from already
struggling programs.190  The Department of Corrections (“DOC”)
offered to staff the case manager position with a DOC probation
185. Grant Support, supra note 180, at 3 (“Violent offenders, as defined in the
former 42 U.S.C. § 37966ii and pages 44 and 93-95 of the Program Guidelines and
Application Kit for the Drug Court Grant Program Fiscal Year 2000, will be ex-
cluded from the drug court programs.”).
186. Anchorage Felony Drug Court Grant, supra note 40, at 4.
187. Id. at 1.
188. The Honorable Stephanie Joannides, Alaska Superior Court, Anchorage,
Notes From the First Meeting of the Drug Court 1 (Aug. 9, 2000) (unpublished
notes, on file with the Alaska Judicial Council) [hereinafter Drug Court Meeting].
189. Anchorage Felony Drug Court Grant, supra note 40, Budget Detail Work-
sheet.
190. Drug Court Meeting, supra note 188, at 1.
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officer, freeing $60,000 to fund treatment.191  A “future funding”
subcommittee was established to identify the program’s future
funding needs and to work to secure state funding.192
The court was scheduled to take its first defendants in October
2000, but several delays occurred.  For example, the process of locat-
ing and contracting with a qualified treatment provider did not con-
clude until March 2001.  In March 2001, the court contracted with a
single non-profit treatment provider, Akeela, Inc.  Due to limited
funding, program expectations were scaled back from thirty partici-
pants at start-up to only ten.193  The court and Akeela agreed that if
enough qualified defendants could pay the full cost of treatment, the
drug court could serve more participants.194  Additional delays were
caused by discussions between the district attorney and the public de-
fender, lasting until June 21, 2001, about various provisions in the
model plea agreement and by discussions that lasted nearly nine
months regarding participant drug testing.
On June 21, 2001, about three years after the planning began,
the Anchorage felony drug court expected to accept its first partici-
pants.  However, at that day’s hearing no defendants appeared.
During the following week, five defendants did opt-in.  Judge
Stephanie Joannides explained the program to each defendant, re-
ferred each for assessment by the treatment provider and scheduled
a return date for two weeks later.195  The treatment provider found
one defendant diagnostically inappropriate, and the remaining de-
fendants formally opted-in to the program.196
The drug court, as implemented, closely resembles the project
described in the grant application.  It targets low-level felony offend-
ers, requires a felony plea of guilty or no contest and treats defen-
dants in a three-phase program that anticipates graduation in twelve
to eighteen months.  Prosecutors and defense attorneys decide eligi-
bility,197 and the treatment provider must favorably assess defendants
191. Notes from the Drug Court Committee Overview Meeting 2-4 (Jan. 29,
2001) (on file with the Alaska Judicial Council).  Committee members assumed
that participants would be required to reimburse the treatment provider on a
sliding scale basis, but did not expect this reimbursement to cover program ex-
penses.  Id.
192. Drug Court Meeting, supra note 188, at Sub-Committee Assignments &
Tasks.
193. Telephone Interview with Pat McBride, Program Coordinator (Mar. 4,
2002).
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Anchorage Felony Drug Court Grant, supra note 40, at 2 (Applicant Infor-
mation).  One issue that arose during planning was the question of access of defen-
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before they can formally opt-in to the program.198  Treatment and
monitoring includes individual and group counseling, twelve-step
programs, self-help activities, random drug testing,199 payment based
on a sliding scale and regular appearances before the drug court
judge.  The judge retains the option of rewarding positive behaviors
with incentives and discouraging negative behaviors with sanctions as
outlined in the written plea agreement signed by each participant.200
The drug court plea agreement provides examples of sanctions that
include
[w]arnings and admonishment from the Drug court Judge in
open court, [c]ommunity work service, [f]ines, [w]ritten assign-
ments, [i]ncreased frequency of court hearings, [i]ncreased coun-
seling sessions and monitoring, submit[ting] to progressive
searches, [i]ncreased AA or NA meetings, [m]ore frequent drug
testing, [d]enial of advancement to next phase, [d]emotion to an
earlier phase, [i]n-patient treatment, [e]scalating periods of con-
finement in jail, [and t]ermination from the program.201
Incentives described in the plea agreement range from
“[e]ncouragement and praise from the bench, [and] certificates of
achievement, [c]eremonies and tokens of progress” to more concrete
enticements such as
advancement to the next treatment phase, [r]educed supervision,
[d]ecreased frequency of court appearances, [r]educed fines or
fees, [d]ismissal of criminal charges or reduction in the term of
dants with non-public defender representation to the program.  Indigent Alaskan
defendants not represented by the Public Defender because of various conflicts are
represented by Office of Public Advocacy attorneys or, less frequently, by court-
appointed attorneys.  Because the public defender agency received all the defense
funding for the program and all the training, access of other defendants to the pro-
gram was at issue.  However, two of the first four defendants accepted were repre-
sented by the Office of Public Attorneys (“OPA”).  Defendants with private attor-
neys also are participating.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 8 (Program Design Narrative).  A substantial part of the program
funding pays for the random drug testing that DCPO considers an essential part of
the program.  In the first, most intensively supervised phase, defendants are ran-
domly tested at least twice weekly.  A positive test results in quick sanctions, ranging
from admonition to jail time.  Id. at 11.
200. MODEL ANCHORAGE DRUG COURT CRIMINAL RULE 11 PLEA AGREEMENT
(Alaska Judicial Council) (on file with the Alaska Judicial Council).
201. Id. at 9-10.
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probation, [r]educed or suspended incarceration, and
[g]raduation.202
The current program also differs from the grant description in
significant ways.  Although the court will consider those who have
committed a new felony offense, it does not plan to accept many
felony probation violators or any offenders whose offense or de-
pendence is solely alcohol-related.203  The program is also much
smaller than envisioned and starts with only ten defendants, rather
than thirty or more.  Finally, the location, and therefore the role, of
the case manager has changed.  Instead of being a treatment pro-
fessional on the staff of the treatment provider, the case manager’s
role is filled by a probation officer, funded by, and with a back-
ground in, corrections.  Because the program is just beginning to
accept participants, further changes in focus or procedures would
not be surprising.
5.  Anchorage DUI and Bethel Therapeutic Justice Courts.  Al-
cohol issues, particularly drunk driving, were on the minds of
Alaska’s legislators during the spring of 2001, the first half of the
twenty-second State Legislature.  Twenty-seven bills and two
resolutions were introduced during the session.  Seven bills and
both resolutions passed; other bills remained alive, pending the
2002 session.  Two of the higher profile bills passed into law re-
duced the threshold blood alcohol level for driving while intoxi-
cated from 0.10% to 0.08%204 and established pilot therapeutic
court projects to handle repeat alcohol- and drug-related of-
fenses.205
The therapeutic court law established new superior court judge-
ships in the Third and Fourth Judicial Districts to provide staff re-
sources for therapeutic justice projects that would achieve “lasting
sobriety of offenders, protection of society from alcohol-related and
drug-related crime, prompt payment of restitution to victims of
crimes, effective interaction and use of resources among criminal jus-
tice and community agencies, and long-term reduction of costs re-
lating to arrest, trial, and incarceration.”206  The legislature expressed
its intent that these judgeships be located in the city of Anchorage
(population 260,000) and the western city of Bethel (population
202. Id. at 10.  In practice, the judge has used other incentives, including tickets to
sporting events and a ride-along with a Fish and Game Officer.
203. 2001 Alaska Sess. Laws ch. 64 (creating an Anchorage DUI Court which
partially responds to the need for an alcohol-related drug court).
204. 2001 Alaska Sess. Laws ch. 63.
205. Id. ch. 64.
206. Id. § 1(a).
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5,500).  The legislature also intended that these therapeutic courts
“focus on defendants charged with multiple driving while intoxicated
offenses[,] . . . serve as working models for the development of other
similar courts in other areas of the state . . . [and] be adapted to fit
the available local resources and cultural traditions” of their lo-
cales.207  The legislation prescribes detailed attributes of the drug
court model to be incorporated into these courts and directs the
Alaska court system, Department of Law, Public Defender Agency,
Department of Corrections, Department of Health and Social Serv-
ices and other agencies to cooperate to implement the pilot pro-
grams through a “mutually agreed-upon plan.”208  The pilot projects
are to run for three years, and by July of 2005, the Alaska Judicial
Council must report to the legislature about their effectiveness.209
In addition to requiring that these courts possess the attributes
typical of the drug court model for defendants (such as emphasis on
personal responsibility, frequent appearances before a designated
judge and timely recognition of progress and sanctions for relapses),
the legislation requires these courts to serve offenders who live in
areas of the state without judges, provide for prompt payment of res-
titution to victims and allow community work service as restoration
to the community.210  The courts must develop a list of sanctions that
the program will use if defendants violate program conditions and
must give the list to all defendants who request referral to the
court.211  The legislation also directs the courts to consider pharma-
ceutical treatment for physical alcohol or drug addiction (specifically
referring to Naltrexone) and allows the court to impose house arrest
and electronic monitoring on participants.212  The prosecutor,
defense or judge may refer a defendant to the court, but the State
may not consent to a referral until the prosecutor has consulted the
victim (if any) of the crime. 213  Victims are entitled to periodic re-
ports on the defendant’s participation and progress in the program.214
As with the Anchorage felony drug court, defendants must plead
guilty or no contest or admit to a probation violation before starting
the program.215  Defense and prosecution may join in a plea agree-
207. Id. § 1(b).
208. Id.
209. Id. § 1(k).
210. Id. § 1(d).
211. Id. § 1(e).
212. Id. § 1(d).
213. Id. § 1(f).  Referrals may include probation violators.  Id. § 1(g).
214. Id. § 1(j).
215. Id. § 1(g).
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ment regarding the charges, and imposition of a sentence is sus-
pended pending completion of the program.216
The planning committee for both the Anchorage and Bethel
courts includes state and local prosecutors and public defenders,
court personnel, representatives of treatment providers, and the De-
partment of Health and Social Services and the Department of Cor-
rections.217  The court system decided to consolidate the Anchorage
superior court therapeutic court caseloads (felony drug court and
repeat DWI offenders) under Judge Stephanie Joannides, who cur-
rently handles the felony drug court caseload.  While the legislation
specified July 1, 2001 as the commencement date for the Anchorage
court,218 the court did not begin the program until the new superior
court judge became available to help handle the remainder of Judge
Joannides’ caseload.  The court planned to start work early in De-
cember 2001, but various delays pushed the date to early 2002.  The
legislation specified January 2, 2002 as the beginning date for the
Bethel court.219  Delays in filling the new Bethel Superior Court posi-
tion and questions about the availability of suitable treatment com-
bined to set a new target date of spring 2002.
6. Other Therapeutic Court Projects.  Several other groups in
Alaska are considering the development of projects using a thera-
peutic model that includes consolidation of all related cases under
one judge, judicial supervision of court-imposed conditions, a
strong emphasis on treatment, monitoring to assure sobriety and a
specific program of incentives and sanctions.  One group is consid-
ering a family court that would use this model in Child in Need of
Aid cases.  The consolidation concept presents several difficult is-
sues, including the possible combination of civil and criminal cases
under one judge, which may raise due process and confidentiality
problems.220  A dozen tribes have planning or implementation
grants from the Department of Justice Drug Court Program Office
216. Id.
217. DUI Court Update 1 (Oct. 15, 2001) (unpublished letter, on file with the
Alaska Judicial Council).
218. Id. §§ 1(b), 7.
219. Id. § 1(b).
220. As of January 2002, a pilot project had been proposed for the Anchorage
Superior Court with a dozen families involved in Child in Need of Aid cases.  The
cases would be heard by Judge Joannides.  The court would apparently deal only
with Child in Need of Aid cases, eliminating the concerns about confidentiality and
due process.
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for drug courts in rural communities.221  Most of the tribal drug
courts are oriented toward juveniles with alcohol problems.
Some judges are considering specialty courts that resemble
therapeutic courts in important ways but differ enough in other as-
pects that planners are not using the term “therapeutic.”222  Several
judges are developing projects that use restorative justice concepts,223
and the increasing number of unfamiliar terms being employed in
these contexts results in confusion between these new projects and
the therapeutic justice courts.  One Anchorage district court judge
uses a judicial supervision model with DWI defendants, but without
the drug court aspects of structured plea agreements, case coordina-
tors or managers, and phased pre-determined programs.224
221. Office of Justice Programs Drug Court Clearinghouse and Technical Assis-
tance Project at American University: Summary of Tribal Drug Court Activity by
State and County 2, Jan. 29, 2002, at http://www.american.edu/justice/publications/
tribalchart.pdf (last visited Feb. 26, 2002).  Tribes that have planning grants are
Orutsararmiut Native Council (Bethel), Native Village of Barrow, Kawerak, Mt.
Sanford Tribal Consortium, Organized Village of Saxman, Native Village of Kwin-
hagak, Organized Village of Kake, Native Village of Unalakleet, the Sitka Tribe,
Chevak, Napaskiak, Kwethluk, Gambell, Chickaloon Village and Tlingit & Haida
(Juneau).  Id.
222. Members of this group of judges have emphasized that such courts would
provide a process for all domestic violence cases, not allowing defendants a choice of
“opting in.”  These courts might consolidate all cases under one judge, provide peri-
odic judicial supervision, emphasize batterers’ intervention programs (which are not
considered treatment) and treatment programs (including treatment for substance
abuse and mental health issues), and monitor participating offenders for their com-
pliance with court conditions.  However, the application of the concept to all domes-
tic violence offenders rather than volunteer participants would change the nature of
the courts.  In the broader sense of therapeutic jurisprudence, this model of court
management would have a therapeutic or anti-therapeutic effect (or mixture), but
because of its differences from the projects that have come to be termed “therapeu-
tic,” and because of rising objections to therapeutic courts, some would prefer that it
not be termed “therapeutic.”  The Honorable Peter Ashman, Alaska District Court,
Anchorage, Meeting Notes, July 3, 2001, Anchorage (discussion regarding domestic
violence monitoring program) (on file with the Alaska Judicial Council); see also
Domestic Violence, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, June 27, 2001, at B6 (discussing con-
sideration of specialty courts by the City of Anchorage and the Anchorage Women’s
Commission).
223. For example, two judges in smaller communities are working to develop
programs that pull community members and victims into the sentencing process us-
ing “circle sentencing.”  Fairness and Access Implementation Committee Meeting
Summary 1, Sept. 10, 2001 (on file with the Alaska Judicial Council).
224. Interview with the Honorable Sigurd Murphy, Alaska District Court, An-
chorage (Feb. 26, 2002).
CARNS_FMT.DOC 05/13/02  10:11 AM
2002]     THERAPEUTIC JUSTICE 43
II.  THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE: LEGAL ISSUES
The concept of therapeutic jurisprudence generally assumes that
the judicial process has a therapeutic or an anti-therapeutic effect but
does not imply any particular approach to justice.225  By contrast, the
therapeutic justice projects discussed in this Article describe a well-
defined approach that differs significantly from that embodied in the
traditional American adversarial system.  Most of the legal issues that
therapeutic justice approaches raise have not been resolved by the
courts, although a few courts have issued opinions addressing them.226
These issues include constitutional concerns, confidentiality issues
and peremptory challenges to judges, a statutory issue of particular
importance to Alaska.
A. Constitutional Issues
Courts that have considered cases involving drug courts have
dealt with a fairly limited range of the possible constitutional issues
that could arise.  The cases collected by the American University
Drug Court Clearinghouse have largely addressed the questions of
separation of powers and equal protection.227
1.  Separation of Powers.  Many drug court-related cases deal
with the defendant’s rights in plea bargaining situations and the
balance of powers between the executive and judicial branches in
determining who is eligible for drug court programs and who
makes the final decisions on admission to them.  Most of the courts
deciding cases related to plea bargains appear to treat drug court
agreements as any other plea bargain.
For example, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals de-
cided, based on existing case law, that the defendant had a binding
agreement with the district attorney that the district attorney could
not subsequently repudiate.228  In a Florida case, the District Court
225. Hora et al., supra note 1, at 445.
226. See, e.g., State v. Filer, 771 So. 2d 700 (Ca. Ct. App. 2000); Ex parte Alissa
Pfalzgraf, 741 So. 2d 1118 (Ala. Crim. App. 1999); State v. Upshaw, 648 So. 2d 851
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
227. OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS DRUG COURT CLEARINGHOUSE AND
TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROJECT AT AMERICAN UNIVERSITY, SELECTED
OPINIONS FROM FEDERAL, STATE AND TRIBAL COURTS RELEVANT TO DRUG
COURT PROGRAMS, PART II: OPINIONS (2001) (the cases discussed in this section
are included in this compilation).
228. Pfalzgraf, 741 So. 2d at 1120.  The defendant had made a plea agreement
with one district attorney, who was later replaced by a newly elected district attor-
ney.  The new district attorney changed the eligibility guidelines for drug court ad-
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of Appeal ruled that because the defendant successfully completed
a pretrial program, the State was bound by the fact that it had of-
fered the defendant the chance to participate in the program and
was obliged to dismiss the charges.229  By the same reasoning—that
the bargain involving the drug court should follow pre-existing law
regarding plea agreements—the Court of Appeal of Louisiana up-
held the trial court’s refusal to allow the defendant to withdraw his
plea of guilty.230  The defendant in that case argued that the prose-
cutor unlawfully induced his guilty plea by recommending drug
court contingent upon a determination in the presentence report
that the defendant was eligible.231  The Court of Appeal held that
the defendant was in the best position to know that he had a prior
felony that disqualified him from participation in drug court, and
therefore the plea was not illegally obtained.232
The other major separation of powers issue focuses on the
prosecutor’s exclusive right to decide initial eligibility for drug court
admission versus the judge’s right to make the final decision about
admission to the drug court.  Several state courts, including those in
Oklahoma and Florida, have held that separation of powers requires
that prosecutors be permitted to make the first determination of ad-
mission to drug courts.  Judges are not allowed to admit defendants
to drug courts over the objections of prosecutors.  On the other hand,
Iowa and Louisiana courts have held that judges have the power to
make the final decision about admission to drug court and are under
no obligation to accept the prosecutor’s recommendation.233
2. Due Process.  A few cases address due process issues that
have arisen in drug courts.  For example, a Washington case held
that the defendant must have a meaningful opportunity to respond
to allegations of non-compliance before being terminated from the
mission and decided that Pfalzgraf did not meet them, so he withdrew his approval
of her admission to drug court.  Id.
229. Upshaw, 648 So. 2d at 853.  The State offered the defendant admission to the
drug court, but after her completion of the program wanted to prosecute her on the
original sale of cocaine charge, which would have made her ineligible to participate
in the program.  The court ruled that once the prosecutor had made the offer, the
defendant had accepted it and the court had ratified it, the agreement “was essen-
tially a plea bargain” and subject to the rules governing plea bargains in Florida
courts.  Id. at 851.
230. Filer, 771 So. 2d at 706.
231. Id. at 702.
232. Id. at 706.
233. State v. Taylor, 769 So. 2d 535, 538 (La. 2000).
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program.234  An Oklahoma case held that the court must give writ-
ten reasons for termination of a defendant. 235  This opinion also
held that the court must state why the program sanctions were in-
adequate or inappropriate for the defendant.236
3. Equal Access to Courts (Equal Protection).  Several courts
have decided that defendants have no right to be admitted to drug
courts and that they can be excluded on a variety of grounds.237
Prior felonies often are mentioned as grounds for ineligibility.238  A
Florida case held that a defendant does not have a constitutional
right to participate in a drug court if one had not been established
in the circuit in which he was charged.239  One tribal appeals court
decided that an alternative court could not provide harsher penal-
ties for a defendant than a regular court.240  One author has warned
that therapeutic justice projects “need to be sensitive to class and
race bias, real or apparent.  Unless care is taken, diversion courts
may tend disproportionately to work with white and middle-class
substance abusers.”241
Several authors have discussed the question of equal access to
drug courts when programs do not have enough slots to serve all of
the eligible defendants, as well as the question of whether the costs of
programs where defendants pay all or part of the costs prohibit indi-
gent defendants from using them.  These problems have often been
addressed in the context of “going to scale”242 or expanding the pro-
234. State v. Valentine, No. 45142-1-I 2000 Wash. App. LEXIS 866, at *1 (Wash.
Ct. App. May 15, 2000).
235. Hagar v. State, 990 P.2d 894, 898-99 (Okla. Crim. App. 1999).
236. Id. at 899.
237. See, e.g., State v. Filer, 771 So. 2d 700 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000); Ex parte Alissa
Pfalzgraf, 741 So. 2d 1118 (Ala. Crim. App. 1999); State v. Upshaw, 648 So. 2d 851
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
238. State v. Turner, 636 So. 2d 815, 817 n.2 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
239. Pennington v. State, No. 96-03750 (Fla. Ct. App. Dec. 1998), summary avail-
able in OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS DRUG COURT CLEARINGHOUSE AND
TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROJECT AT AMERICAN UNIVERSITY, SELECTED
OPINIONS FROM FEDERAL, STATE AND TRIBAL COURTS RELEVANT TO DRUG
COURT PROGRAMS, PART I:  DECISION SUMMARIES (2001).  This case involved a
physician who, because of statutory authorization, would have been able to have
charges against him dismissed as a result of successful completion of a drug court
program.  However, no drug court program had been established in his circuit.  He
entered a conditional nolo plea and appealed, but the court upheld the conviction.
240. Blackfeet Tribe v. Rutherford, No. 00-AC-41 (Blackfeet Ct. App. Aug. 16,
2000) in OJP Selected Cases, supra note 227, at 161..
241. Gebelein, supra note 29, at 5.
242. “Going to scale” means applying therapeutic justice principles to most of-
fenders rather than a selected few.
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grams to serve the estimated seventy to eighty percent of defendants
who have substance abuse problems.243  One court commentator
noted: “[W]e must address the fact that we are providing more re-
sources for a misdemeanor drug offense than we are for a non-capital
murder offense or a rape offense.  Most states can’t afford to con-
tinue to do this—politically and fiscally—if problem-solving courts go
to scale.”244
Another equal access issue has arisen in the context of evaluat-
ing therapeutic justice programs.  The most rigorous evaluations
would use a system of random assignment of eligible defendants to
either a therapeutic justice project or to a control group not receiving
comparable services.245  This approach was considered for the An-
chorage Felony Drug Court, but it was rejected by planning com-
mittee members on the grounds that it would be unfair to exclude
some defendants at random.246  Other projects have used random
selection of control groups in reported evaluations.247
4. First Amendment.  Two New York cases do not directly
relate to drug courts but address the question of whether defen-
dants can be required to participate in AA programs as a condition
of probation or eligibility for other programs while incarcerated.
In 1999, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
held that the Orange County Department of Probation violated the
First Amendment by recommending the plaintiff’s participation in
243. See Wellness Court Byrne Grant, supra note 40, at 1-3.
244. Feinblatt & Denckla, supra note 21, at 214.
245. ROGER H. PETERS, EVALUATING DRUG COURT PROGRAMS: AN OVERVIEW
OF ISSUES AND ALTERNATIVE STRATEGIES 16 (1996).
The most desirable type of evaluation design for a drug court program is
an experimental model, in which defendants are randomly assigned to
one of two groups: (1) an experimental group, that participates in the full
range of program activities, and (2) a control group, that does not receive
services, or that receives services that were available prior to implemen-
tation of the drug court program.
Id. (emphasis in original).
246. Id. at 17.
For example, the judge, prosecutor, or defense attorney may object to
random assignment of defendants in determining who will receive the
services of the drug court program. Public defenders may argue that it is
unfair to arbitrarily withhold beneficial program services from defen-
dants who have a demonstrated need for treatment simply on the basis of
research design factors. Issues of equal protection under the law may
also be raised if defendants are randomly assigned to “treatment” or “no
treatment” groups.
Id.
247. Id. at 16-17.
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AA as a condition of a probationary sentence.248 Another case, de-
cided in 1996 by the Court of Appeals of New York, held that be-
cause of the religious nature of AA, the prison could not impose a
requirement that the defendant participate as a condition of eligi-
bility for a Family Reunion program.249
These cases are important because AA programs or similar
programs often are recommended or required as one of the condi-
tions of drug court participation in addition to any other require-
ments.  For example, AA participation may be required as a part of
the Wellness Court conditions.250  Participation in AA is not always
a requirement for Anchorage Felony Drug Court participants or
Court Coordinated Resource Project clients, but it may be required
for some individuals.  Some judges also impose AA attendance as a
condition of probation for some defendants.251
5.  Other Issues.  The non-adversarial approach used in thera-
peutic courts raises questions for many attorneys.  Defense attor-
neys suggest that the drug court environment creates too much
pressure to give up suppression motions, legal defenses to the
charges and other defense tools before trial.
Some writers, however, suggest that problem-solving courts
can protect individual rights prior to trial by using an adversarial
approach at that point, saving the collaborative approach for the
post-conviction therapeutic activities.252  They suggest that in the
traditional plea system, the defense attorney’s role is mostly limited
to sentencing advocacy because few cases go to trial.253  Others note
248. Warner v. Orange County Dep’t of Probation, 173 F.3d 120, 120 (2d Cir.
1999).
249. Griffin v. Coffin, 649 N.Y.S.2d 903, 904 (1996).
250. Naltrexone Treatment Order, supra note 91, at 1 (on file with the Alaska
Judicial Council).
251. Interview with the Honorable Stephanie Rhoades, Alaska District Court,
Anchorage (July 26, 2001).
252. See Feinblatt et al., supra note 32, at 32.  The authors note:
[T]hroughout the adjudication process—up until a defendant decides, by
virtue of pleading to reduced charges, to enter treatment—prosecutors
and defenders relate to one another (and the judge) much as they always
have: as adversaries.  In addition to contesting the merits of each case,
advocates in drug courts also argue about eligibility criteria, the length of
treatment sentences, and appropriate treatment modalities (for example,
outpatient versus residential).
Id.;  see also Feinblatt & Denckla, supra note 21, at 209-10.
253. Feinblatt & Denckla, supra note 21, at 212 (“For a long time before prob-
lem-solving courts existed, the defense attorney’s function has been mostly limited
to sentencing advocacy . . . .  It’s a rare case that you get to argue that your client
is not guilty and go to trial on the merits.”).
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that the traditional plea system is coercive for most defendants, al-
lowing relatively little time for defendants to consider plea offers,
and argue that drug courts are no more coercive than the existing
plea bargaining system. 254  Not all are comfortable with the change
in the defense attorney’s approach from adversarial, focusing on
minimizing “a client’s exposure to criminal sanctions,”255 to collabo-
rative, focusing on aiding the defendant’s “recovery from addiction
and not [on] the exercise of the full panoply of the defendant’s
rights.”256
B. Confidentiality
Therapeutic courts in Alaska frequently handle sensitive in-
formation concerning participants in the programs.  Programs deal
with records related to participants’ histories of drug or alcohol
abuse treatment and records related to participants’ histories of
mental health treatment.  Specific statutory or regulatory confiden-
tiality protections apply to both types of records.
1. Drug and Alcohol Courts.  Drug and alcohol courts require
access to participants’ drug and alcohol abuse treatment records.
Information concerning a defendant’s treatment history is collected
as part of the defendant’s initial opt-in screening or assessment.
The program’s treatment assessor uses this information in deter-
mining whether the defendant is diagnostically appropriate for in-
clusion in the program and in designing an appropriate case plan.
Once a program has accepted a defendant, the drug or alcohol
court team uses reports of that person’s ongoing treatment compli-
ance and prognosis to assess the person’s progress. The judge uses
the reports to award incentives, impose sanctions and determine
whether the participant should graduate, continue in the program
or be terminated from the program.
Federal statutes and regulations protect information about an
individual’s participation in drug or alcohol abuse treatment pro-
grams.257  These provisions are intended to encourage substance
abusers to seek treatment by ensuring that all treatment details, in-
cluding the fact that a person has participated in a treatment pro-
254. See, e.g., id. at 210 (“You have to be realistic.  Problem-solving courts are
not so different than any other kind of plea-bargaining court.  Usually, you have
until the next day to decide to take this plea or it’s off the table.”); Feinblatt, supra
note 32, at 33 (suggesting that drug courts are no more coercive than the existing
plea bargaining system).
255. Hora et al., supra note 1, at 479.
256. Id. at 480.
257. 42 U.S.C. § 290dd-2 (2000); 42 C.F.R. § 2.20 (2001).
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gram, will remain private between the patient and the treatment
provider.258  The regulations restrict access to and disclosure of in-
formation in the possession of a federally assisted drug or alcohol
abuse program that would allow direct or indirect identification of
a patient as an alcohol or drug abuser.259  A violation of the statute
or its accompanying regulation is a crime, punishable by fines of up
to $5,000, loss of federal funding and loss of licenses under state
law.260 These provisions are not absolute, however, because patients
may consent to disclosure of their records,261 and the rules contain
other narrow exceptions to strict confidentiality.262
Drug and alcohol courts face two significant issues created by
this federal regulatory scheme.  First, the courts must know the
drug and alcohol treatment histories of potential program partici-
pants and the current treatment progress of offenders actively par-
ticipating in the programs.  Drug and alcohol courts usually inter-
view potential participants about their treatment histories.263
Participants consent to release treatment information, both past
and future, when they first apply for the programs.  The Code of
Federal Regulations contains a model release, specifying the ele-
ments that a patient must include in a consent to disclose drug or
alcohol abuse treatment records.264  These elements include the
specific designation of the programs or persons allowed to make
the disclosures; the specific persons or organizations to which dis-
258. See NATIONAL DRUG COURT INSTITUTE, FEDERAL CONFIDENTIALITY
LAWS AND HOW THEY EFFECT [SIC] DRUG COURT PRACTITIONERS 2 (1999) [here-
inafter Confidentiality Laws].
259. See id. at 6-7.  “Federally assisted” is broadly interpreted to include direct
or indirect funding.  A drug or alcohol court that is an arm of a state or local gov-
ernment that receives federal assistance for any program is considered to be re-
ceiving federal assistance.  Id. at 6.
260. Id. at 8.
261. Id. at 10.  The consent provisions are narrowly drawn and require a variety
of conditions, including the defendant’s right to revoke consent and the point at
which the consent will expire.  The discussion notes that “a participant’s consent
to disclosure is not inherently invalid simply because this consent was a condition
of drug court participation and the participant faced a substantial prison sentence
if he or she did not enroll in the drug court.”  Id.
262. Id. at 13-15. Other exceptions include (among others) medical emergen-
cies, state child abuse reporting requirements, research and audit activities and
certain court orders involving specified criminal investigations or prosecutions.
Id.
263. The federal regulations prevent treatment programs from disclosing pa-
tient records to anyone else.  Patients are always free to give information about
their treatment histories to others.  42 U.S.C. § 290dd-2 (2000).
264. 42 C.F.R. § 2.31(b) (2001).
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closure may be made; the purpose of the disclosure; how much and
what kind of information may be disclosed; and the date, event or
condition upon which the consent will expire if not previously re-
voked.265  Expiration must occur no later than reasonably necessary
to serve the purpose for which the consent is given.266
In Alaska, as in the federal model, the felony drug court ob-
tains consent to release treatment records, based on the federal
model, from potential participants at initial opt-in.  The felony drug
court requires an additional consent as part of the plea agreement.
The Wellness Court also obtains a release at the initial opt-in stage,
typically using release forms provided by the treatment providers
with which it works.  Wellness Court releases must be renewed an-
nually.
The second issue facing drug and alcohol courts stems from
the fact that the regulatory definition of “program” encompasses
virtually all of these courts.  This subjects them to the regulatory
restrictions on disclosure of information that might identify a pa-
tient as an alcohol or drug abuser.267  A problem arises because the
courts conduct public proceedings.  Although most interactions
among judges, attorneys and offenders in drug court do not go into
significant detail about a participant’s treatment,268 the mere fact
that a person is participating in a drug or alcohol court program in-
dicates that the person has abused alcohol or drugs.  One author
notes that part of drug court procedure is for the judge to “hold[]
the offender publicly accountable for the results of the [drug use]
test and the treatment progress.”269  The regulations thus create a
conflict between public access to court proceedings and the court’s
duty not to identify or discuss drug and alcohol court participants
in a public setting.
The regulations require that a written notice to the recipients
of information accompany each disclosure, warning them that they
may not re-disclose any information they have acquired or use it
265. Id.
266. Id. § 2.31(a)(9).
267. Confidentiality Laws, supra note 258, at 6-7.
268. The drug court team and participants typically discuss results of the initial
assessment (indicating whether an offender is diagnostically appropriate for a
drug or alcohol treatment program), participants’ compliance with treatment pro-
gram conditions, and the results of drug or alcohol monitoring in open court in a
drug or wellness court session.
269. Hora et al., supra note 1, at 475.
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for law enforcement purposes.270  The regulations require does not
clarify the participants’ ability to agree to allow the court or others
to disclose treatment information in a drug court session.
Use of treatment information by drug and alcohol courts is de-
scribed in the Code of Federal Regulations in a section titled
“[d]isclosures to elements of the criminal justice system which have
referred patients.”271  Drug court team members are permitted to
use such information for their “official duties with regard to the pa-
tient’s conditional release or other action in connection with which
the consent was given.”272  One authority states that the federal
regulations have been interpreted to allow team members to men-
tion confidential information in court.273  Such discussions consti-
tute the team members’ official duties and are related to the action
for which the consent to release information was given.274  The
authority goes on to say that drug court officials
should be mindful that consent has not been given to disclose
confidential information to unnamed third party bystanders in
the courtroom (e.g., public, press and law enforcement).  There-
fore, courtroom discussions should avoid specific, confidential
details of a person’s treatment experience and, instead, focus on
more general concerns such as the participant’s progress.275
The same authority notes that the question of whether confi-
dentiality rules apply to drug courts has not been fully resolved.  It
advises drug courts to
label files (court and program) “confidential” and limit access to
the drug court team and staff only, educate drug court team and
staff on confidentiality law and how drug court information will
be maintained, refrain from posting court calenders [sic] labeled
“Drug Court,” review your management information system to
determine where drug court information is kept and who has ac-
cess to it, and utilize written consent forms for every possible
disclosure.276
270. Confidentiality Laws, supra note 258, at 9 (“[A] participant’s consent to
disclosure by a therapist to a probation officer does not thereby permit disclosure
by the probation officer to any other person.”).
271. 42 C.F.R. § 2.35 (2001).
272. Id. § 2.35(d).
273. Id.
274. Id.
275. Id.
276. Justice Programs Office, American University School of Public Affairs,
Frequently Asked Questions, at http://www.american.edu/spa/justice/publications/
confidentiality1.htm (last updated Aug. 15, 2001).
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2. Mental Health Courts.  The State plays a more active role
in regulating access to, and disclosure of, patient mental health re-
cords than does federal law.277 Alaska Statutes section 47.30.590
provides that “[t]he [D]epartment [of Health and Social Services]
shall adopt regulations to assure patient rights and to safeguard the
confidential nature of records and information about the recipients
of [welfare and other social services].”278  Regulations promulgated
under this statute give patients the right to confidential treatment
of their records279 and allow patients to give written authority to
disclose their records.280
The mental health courts, like the felony drug courts and
Wellness Court, must have access to treatment histories to deter-
mine potential participants’ eligibility for the program.  The courts
need access to ongoing treatment records to monitor a participant’s
compliance with program conditions and progress.  Like the other
courts’ participants, mental health court participants consent to
release treatment information when they are first considering the
program.  The consent authorizes named treatment providers to
exchange specified information with each other and with named
court team members and authorizes recipients of the information
to further “disclose it only in connection with their official du-
ties.”281  The state mental health regulations, unlike the federal drug
and alcohol regulations, do not include courts among the programs
that must meet disclosure requirements.  Thus, the consent form
currently used allows court team members to discuss participants’
cases in open court.282
277. Newly adopted federal regulations promulgated under the Health Insur-
ance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 may significantly influence the
confidentiality and disclosure of patient mental health records.  These regulations
were published in December 2000 and took effect in April 2001. Covered entities
(health plans, health care clearinghouses and health care providers who conduct
certain financial and administrative transactions electronically) have until April
14, 2003 to comply.  Small health plans have until April 14, 2004 to comply.  See
Judge David L. Bazelon, Center for Mental Health Law, New Federal Privacy
Regulations, at http://www.bazelon.org/privacyregulations.html (last visited Feb.
13, 2002).
278. ALASKA STAT. § 47.30.590 (Michie 2000).
279. ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 7, § 71.210(b)(5) (2001).
280. Id. § 71.215(c).
281. Anchorage District Court/Court Coordinated Resources Project (CRP)
Release of Information (May 7, 2001) (draft) (on file with the Alaska Judicial
Council).
282. If the mental health court should come into possession of drug or alcohol
abuse patient records, the court would not be considered a “program” subject to
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C. Peremptory Challenges to Judges
An issue peculiar to Alaska and a handful of other states arises
from the statutory rights of parties to peremptorily challenge the
judge assigned to a case.283  The court rule implementing the Alaska
statute284 permits parties to challenge the judge within five days of
the judge’s assignment to a case.285  Each party has a single chal-
lenge, available in all types of cases: civil, criminal and domestic.
No reason for the challenge need be cited in making the motion to
change the judge.
Most judges receive relatively few challenges.286  Occasionally
an institutional party such as a prosecutor’s office or a defense
agency will routinely challenge a judge on certain types of cases.
This can rise to a level at which the challenges begin to create sub-
stantial administrative problems, especially in smaller courts with
only one judge available to hear most cases.287  The peremptory
challenge right could create similar problems for therapeutic courts
for which only one or two judges are trained and scheduled.288  The
collaborative and voluntary nature of the therapeutic courts as they
are presently structured may help avoid difficulties at the present
time.
III.  CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS
Therapeutic justice is too new a practice in Alaska to have
been evaluated for its effectiveness.  Experiences of other jurisdic-
42 C.F.R. § 2, because it does not diagnose drug or alcohol abuse or refer clients
for drug or alcohol abuse treatment.  See 42 C.F.R. § 2.11 (2001).  Because the
court would be subject to the federal prohibition against redisclosure of such rec-
ords for those cases, it should follow the confidentiality recommendations set out
above for drug and alcohol courts.  Id. § 2.32.
283. Teresa White Carns, Alaska Judicial Council, Peremptory Challenges to
Judges: Survey of Other Jurisdictions 1 (1983) (unpublished report) (on file with
the Alaska Judicial Council).
284. ALASKA STAT. § 22.20.022 (Michie 2000).
285. ALASKA R. CIV. P. 42(c); ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 25(d).
286. See Alaska Judicial Council, Peremptory Challenge Records for Judges
Eligible for Retention in 2000 (Apr. 24, 2000), at http://www.ajc.state.ak.us
/Retention00/retgen5.htm.
287. See, e.g.,  Hornaday v. Rowland, 674 P.2d 1333 (Alaska 1983) (involving a
dispute over the administrative order by a presiding superior court judge to trans-
fer another judge from Homer to Anchorage because of his high rate of peremp-
tory challenges for criminal cases).
288. Even jurisdictions without peremptory challenges must plan for judicial
leave and challenges for cause.  The opportunity for peremptory challenges exac-
erbates a situation that most courts will face sooner rather than later.
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tions suggest that its principles hold promise for cases in which
treatment—either for addictions or for mental health problems—
could significantly reduce a defendant’s likelihood of recidivism.289
Although therapeutic justice approaches tend to be resource-
intensive in the short run, most appear to cost at least one-third less
than the cost of a comparable period of incarceration. They also
appear to reduce recidivism significantly more than incarceration,
which should result in substantial long-term reductions in prison
populations.
In Alaska, the court’s commitment to using therapeutic justice
principles has fostered a hospitable atmosphere for innovation.
Several formal projects are applying the principles to defendants
with drug, alcohol and mental health problems.  Other judges are
experimenting with therapeutic justice principles informally.
Judges are working with other justice system professionals to de-
sign therapeutic courts for parties with a variety of problems.  De-
spite skepticism about effectiveness, concerns about costs and
questions about the philosophical validity of the therapeutic ap-
proach, many practitioners seem willing to agree that other ap-
proaches have not lessened recidivism or the ever-growing costs of
the justice system.
Most observers agree that therapeutic justice projects must be
evaluated to demonstrate their effectiveness. Beyond that, sugges-
tions for improvement are numerous but not necessarily consistent.
The greatest agreement is reached on the proposition that more re-
sources for staffing and treatment would enable therapeutic courts
to operate more effectively and serve more offenders.  Applying
therapeutic justice principles to most offenders rather than a se-
lected few—or “going to scale”—suggests a range of issues beyond
the basic question of cost.  One observer hypothesized that going
to scale might involve restoring some balance among judicial dis-
cretion, prosecutorial discretion and legislative mandates:
[m]ost courts have had judicial discretion reined in by new penal
law provisions passed by legislatures that tend to give greater
discretion to the prosecutor. Many problem-solving courts [have]
some arrangement between the court and the prosecutor’s office
in which the prosecutor cedes some discretion to the court. This
dynamic tension between prosecutorial and judicial discretion is
important in understanding what’s been happening and what’s
going to happen to problem-solving courts in the future.290
Other issues that expanding the programs will raise are likely to in-
clude the balancing of sanctions and the difficulty of the program
289. 2001 Update, supra note 19, at 7.
290. Feinblatt & Denckla, supra note 21, at 214.
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with the potential benefits perceived by each defendant, the bal-
ancing of the coercive nature of therapeutic courts with constitu-
tionally guaranteed protections for defendants,291 and the conse-
quences of applying therapeutic principles in one part of the justice
system and the social services system but not in others.292
291. One proponent of therapeutic justice believes that the balance falls heavily
on the side of society’s right to control diseases and says that “legalization [of drug
use] proponents do not necessarily favor drug treatment, as it would violate the
individual’s right to personal liberty at all costs . . . . They would not quarantine
. . . the diseased [of drug . . . addiction] . . . .  They would allow the disease to
spread.”  TAUBER, supra note 36, at 9.
292. For example, a Health Policy professor suggests that using therapeutic jus-
tice principles in courts will require changes in the child protection and other so-
cial systems in order to be effective.   Berman, supra note 33, at 85.
